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Abstract
Inflation targeting has become an increasingly popular regime among emerg-
ing markets. Focusing on the experience of inflation targeting adoption in
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, this thesis highlights the main features of the inflation targeting
framework. A clear economic condition bringing these countries together is
considered the dollarization issue which gains importance when designing the
inflation targeting framework. The empirical study on the impact of inflation
targeting in inflation, inflation volatility, output, output volatility and deposit
dollarization shows clear benefits of inflation targeting in terms of inflation and
inflation volatility, which are not achieved at the expense of output growth.
Also, dollarization does not harm the positive impact of inflation targeting on
inflation.
JEL Classification E52, E58, F59, H61
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Inflation targeting in dollarized countries
Topic characteristics
My thesis will focus on the impact of the inflation targeting in dollarized coun-
tries like: Serbia, Albania, Georgia, Moldova, etc. Inflation targeting is a
monetary policy regime that was first used in New Zealand in 1990 which was
followed by many other developed countries. The aim of this monetary policy
is to achieve price stability through targeting directly inflation and not any in-
termediate variable. Many studies have been conducted to analyze the process
of inflation targeting in developed countries and some others have compared
the experiences of the inflation targeting in developed and emerging markets.
My thesis aims to study how the inflation targeting has been implemented in
dollarized countries in our region and its impact on the macroeconomics per-
formance of these countries. The time since the adoption of the IT in these
countries is short, and makes any analysis of the situation preliminary, but the
thesis aims to view the impacts of IT on output, volatility of exchange rates,
interest rates, international reserves and output growth. Also, an emphasis
will be put on the change in credibility and the issue of preconditions in these
countries.
Hypotheses
My hypotheses regarding the inflation targeting in dollarized countries are the
following:
1. The level and volatility of inflation prior to the adoption of IT is higher
than after the adoption.
2. Inflation targeting causes a reduction on the level of inflation expecta-
tions.
Master Thesis Proposal xi
3. Inflation targeting is accompanied by little or no effect on output volatil-
ity.
4. Inflation targeting improves the macroeconomic performance.
5. Inflation targeting improves the inflation situation more than other mon-
etary policy regimes.
Methodology
Since I want to determine the impact of the inflation targeting on the macroeco-
nomic performance of these countries, I will use difference-in-difference method
to control for the reversion to the mean. This method consists in regressing the
difference of an economic variables affected by IT in the period before and after
the adoption of IT to a dummy variable for targeters. The economic variables
that will be taken into consideration are: inflation level, inflation volatility,
inflation expectations, real GDP growth and the growth volatility. The time
period will be divided into pre- and post- period for IT adoption. All countries
with a hyperinflation periods of over 50% will be removed from the sample.
Outline
1. Introduction: What is inflation targeting?
(a) The definition of inflation targeting
(b) The advantages and disadvantages
(c) Preconditions for the adoption of IT
2. Comparison with alternative monetary policies
(a) Alternative monetary policies: Exchange rate targeting and Mone-
tary targeting
(b) Pros’ and cons’ for IT





4. Theory and empirical methodology
(a) Theory
Master Thesis Proposal xii
(b) Empirical methodology
(c) Data and diagnostics
(d) Models
(e) Empirical results and assessment of impact
5. Conclusion
Core bibliography
Ball, L., and N.Sheridan, 2005, ”Does Inflation Targeting Matter?” The
Inflation Targeting Debate ed. By B.S.Bernanke and M.Woodford, pp.249-276
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Batini,N., and D.Laxton, 2006, ”Under What Conditions can Inflation Tar-
geting be adopted? The experience of Emerging Markets,” Central Bank of
Chile, Working Paper No.406.
Bernanke, B.S., and F.Mishkin. ”Inflation Targeting: A New Framework
for Monetary Policy?” NBER Working Paper, 5893, 1997.
Freedman C., and D.Laxton, 2009, ”Inflation Targeting Pillars: Trans-
parency and Accountability,” IMF Working Paper 09/262 (Washington Inter-
national Monetary Fund).
Luci, E., and F.Ibrahimi, 2007, ”Issues in Adopting Inflation Targeting in
Albania Revisited,” draft Working Paper prepared for Monetary Policy Trans-
mission and Inflation Modeling Seminar (Chisinau, Moldova).
Mishkin, Frederick S., 1999, ”International Experiences With Different Mon-
etary Policy Regime,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.43 (June), pp.579-
606.
Kasa, Keneth, 2001, ”Will inflation targeting work in developing countries”,
FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Issue Jan.12.
Roger, S., 2010, ”Inflation Targeting Turns 20,” Finance & Development
Master Thesis Proposal xiii
(March), pp.46-49.
Svensson, Lars E.O., 1998, ”Inflation Targeting in an Open Economy: Strict
or Flexible Inflation Targeting,” public lecture held at Victoria University of
Wellington, November 1997, Victoria Economic Commentaries, Vol.15, No.1
(Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University)
Taylor, John B., 1999. ”The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy
rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the European central bank,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 655-679, June.




To assure low and stable inflation, generally associated with a healthy economy
and long run growth, economists have been on the quest for a successful mone-
tary policy which anchors inflation expectations correctly. Moreover, they aim
for this monetary policy to be flexible enough in response to shocks and still
keep the credibility of the regime. In the past two decades, inflation targeting
has been chosen by an increasing number of countries as their monetary pol-
icy framework. The first country to adopt inflation target was New Zealand in
1989 and was followed by many other industrial countries like United Kingdom,
Sweden, Finland, Australia, Israel and Spain. By the start of 2013, 29 coun-
tries are considered inflation targeters, while there are several other emerging
countries in the process of adopting it, having adopted only some aspects of
this regime. Spain, Finland and Slovak Republic are the only countries which
quit inflation targeting as they started the process of euro adoption. Despite
the initial trend of adopting inflation targeting in developed countries, some
transition economies like Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also adopted it
by mid 90’s.
In general, inflation targeting was adopted after the failure of other mone-
tary policy regimes. Prior to inflation targeting, the nominal anchor was chosen
to be either the gold standard or fixing the exchange rate of the domestic cur-
rency to a foreign one. Under inflation targeting, the main goal of the central
bank is to achieve price stability through a nominal anchor.
This master thesis aims to provide an analysis of the existing literature re-
garding the impacts of inflation target in the macroeconomic performance of
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inflation targeting economies and show some new empirical results regarding
the outcomes of adopting inflation targeting in dollarized economies in Central
and East Europe and Commonwealth of Independent countries. Most of these
countries have recently moved to democratic systems and are still reforming
their institutions to work with current situation. More importantly, they are
becoming essential countries for the region, making the study of their monetary
policy interesting. The thesis aims to focus on the impact of inflation targeting
in these countries, accounting for dollarization. Although most of the coun-
tries adopting inflation target have tailored it to their environment, empirical
analysis and generalized conclusions are still possible.1
This master thesis is organized as following. Chapter one presents a gen-
eral definition of inflation targeting together with some general characteristics,
advantages, disadvantages and the preconditions to be met. Chapter two pro-
vides a comparative analysis between different monetary policy frameworks,
while chapter three shows a general overview of the literature regarding dol-
larization and emphasizes the importance of dollarization on the adoption of
inflation targeting. A short glance on the rationale for adoption of inflation
target and general performance of each targeting country is presented in chap-
ter four, while chapter five includes a survey of general literature on inflation
targeting during the past 22 years. The empirical study is presented in chapter
six and includes: description of data, country and period samples, method-
ology, robustness check and conclusion. Chapter seven summarizes the main
ideas and conclusions.
1.2 What is inflation targeting?
The simplest definition of inflation targeting would describe it as a monetary
policy strategy aiming price stability. However, this would not be enough.
Since 1989, when it was introduced, several definitions have been provided
differing in details but generally viewing inflation targeting as a framework in
which central bank maintains the level of inflation announced publicly during
a medium-term period. In the general literature, an inflation targeting central
bank is characterized by four main characteristics (Mishkin 2001; Roger 2010):
1See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997).
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• Defined quantitative targets for inflation in medium term are publicly
announced by the central bank;
• Central Bank’s main goal of monetary policy is to achieve price stability;
• Central bank is required to be highly transparent and accountable during
the implementation of the monetary policy and its performance in achiev-
ing the target. Central Bank continuously communicates to the public
the objectives set, decisions taken by the bank authorities and outcome;
• The policy framework of the central bank would focus on future inflation
by taking into account a lot of information in defining the settings of
policy instruments.
To further explain the framework of inflation targeting, Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997), used the term ’constrained discretion’ which expresses the coexistence
and tradeoff between rule and discretion in this framework. They point out
that inflation target does not set strict rules to central banks, but allows them
to use their judgment and models together with all the necessary information
to achieve the inflation target. Following the same popular definition of ’con-
strained discretion’, Svensson (1998) argued that on one hand, inflation target
clearly sets goals, duties, and defines the responsible and accountable party for
achieving the target but on the other hand, it allows the central bank enough
flexibility to choose the monetary tools and use them according to its judg-
ment to achieve the target and properly react to short term unexpected events
in the economy. However, it is worth noticing that despite several definitions
on inflation targeting, the general belief is that it is not a new policy regime
since it includes the main positive elements of different monetary policy regimes
(Petursson, 2005).
The next question to be posed is ’when an economy is considered an inflation
targeter?’ It is accepted that for a country to be classified as an inflation target,
it is not enough to just announce a numerical value and declare price stability
as its main objective of the monetary policy. Many countries build a practice
of announcing inflation targets but continue to adopt either monetary targets
or exchange rate targets unlike fully-fledged inflation targeting countries which
adopt inflation targeting as their main policy objective. Also, defining price
stability the main objective of the monetary policy does not make an economy
inflation targeting since most of the central banks nowadays have price stability
as a goal. A clear example is the European Central Bank (ECB) which declares
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to aim keeping inflation at a rate below 2% but it is not considered an inflation
targeter.
Loayza and Soto (2002) explain that one should be careful when considering
a country an inflation targeter because it affects the evaluation results of the
monetary framework. A broad definition would include many countries which
have characteristics of inflation target and overstate the effects of monetary
policy. However a narrow definition would under-evaluate the effects of inflation
targeting. In this thesis, inflation targeting countries are considered only those
countries whose central banks publicly state inflation target as their monetary
policy framework.
A general classification on inflation targeting regime provided by Carare and
Stone (2003) answers the question above. There exist three types of inflation
targeting: fully fledged inflation target, implicit price stability anchor, and
inflation targeting lite.
• Fully fledged inflation target is the kind of inflation target adopted and
announced by the central banks which are usually characterized by good
credibility, commitment, and transparency in adoption of the framework.
These banks publish the forecasts of inflation together with the policy
actions to be undertaken. Not only developed countries like New Zealand
and United Kingdom, but also emerging markets like the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland are considered fully fledged inflation targeters.
• Implicit price stability anchor is used by central banks with high level of
credibility and a history of stable and low inflation. These central banks
can ensure price stability even though they are not highly transparent
and accountable to public regarding monetary policy. European Central
bank is such an example.
• Inflation targeting lite is typical for central banks with low level of credi-
bility which announce broad inflation targets and face difficulty to fulfill
the objectives of inflation target. The most frequent difficulties faced by
them are: short term shocks, undeveloped financial markets, macroeco-
nomic instability and high level of dollarization.
Another debate emerges over the adoption date of inflation target. While
for the developed countries the adoption dates are somehow clear, for many
emerging countries they are not clear since some of them may have used other
policy targets in addition to inflation target and the transition towards the
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dominance of inflation target took some time. Some studies consider as adop-
tion date the date when the target was announced, while other studies consider
the date when all the necessary features for adoption of IT were in place.
Vega and Winkerlried (2005) argue that based on the ways of considering
adoption dates targeting emerging countries can be divided into two categories.
Soft IT are the economies which have started to adopt some kind of IT while
fully fledged IT are the economies whose central banks have announced pub-
licly a numerical target. They argue that most of the emerging market econo-
mies which suffered from periods of high inflation, decided first to use soft IT
and bring inflation down to low levels before fully adopting inflation targeting
framework. Table 1.1 2 shows the different adoption dates for nine inflation
targeting countries to be studied in this thesis.
Table 1.1: The inflation targeting countries
Roger (2010)
Country Year of adoption Target at adoption Target at 2012
Average inflation in 
2012
1 Albania 2009 3%+/-1 3%+/-1 3,4%
2 Armenia 2006 3% 4%+/-1.5 7,7%
3 Czech Republic 1997 5.5% - 6.5% 2%+/-1 1,9%
4 Georgia 2009 9% 6% 8,5%
5 Hungary 2001 7%+/-1  3% 3,9%
6 Moldova 2010 5%+/-1.5 5%+/-1.5 7,7%
7 Poland 1998 4% 2.5%+/-1 4,3%
8 Romania 2005 7.5%+/-1  3%+/-1  5,8%
9 Serbia 2006 7% - 9% 4%+/-1.5 11,1%
10 Turkey 2006 5% 5%+/-2 6,5%
Source: Central Banks, Roger (2010), for adoption dates and WEO for average inflation in
2012. Although Albania and Georgia are not included in most of the literature on inflation
targeting, both central banks publish information which shows a process of inflation target
performance.
1.3 Preconditions for inflation targeting adoption
The experience of countries which have adopted inflation targeting has led to
the conclusion that certain preconditions have to be met in order for the regime
to be successful. Among the most important ones are the following:
2Moldova adopted inflation target by 2010 and is included in the descriptive and analytical
part of the thesis to observe the conditions in place there. However, it is not included in the
empirical part, due to its few years of experience with inflation target.
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Central bank objective and independence
The inflation targeting central bank’s internal regulations state that the
primary goal of monetary policy is price stability but sometimes, the goal
of price stability is accompanied by additional objectives like employment or
economic growth. A strong institutional commitment to achieve price stability
as the main goal of monetary policy should be in place for inflation target
adoption also because it reduces the chances of time inconsistency traps caused
by political pressures (Kadioglu, Ozdemir and Yilmaz, 2000).
Institutional independence increases the chances for the framework to be
successful since it ensures a full institutional support for this monetary frame-
work (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). Even though central bank inde-
pendence has been praised a lot, setting the proper relationship between the
government and the central bank in the inflation targeting framework is crucial.
On one had the central bank should be allowed to have complete authority in
defining its monetary policy instruments. On the other hand, a commitment
by the government in the process of successful implementation of inflation tar-
get is necessary to ensure cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy. It
is generally believed that such a relationship exists when the target is decided
jointly.
Technical infrastructure
Having in mind that inflation forecast is crucial for the inflation target-
ing framework, a well developed technical infrastructure should be in place,
to incorporate good quality data, forecasting and modeling techniques. Proper
methodology for conducting inflation forecasts should exist and qualified people
to work with these methodologies should be hired or trained because human
capital is very important in this process. Khan (2003) argues that the ab-
sence of the technical infrastructure can be solved by continuous training and
assistance from other more experienced inflation targeting central banks.
In almost all the countries in CEE and CIS, the technical infrastructure was
not in place at the time of adoption, but internal review and close collaboration
with other central banks improved forecasting and modeling techniques. How-
ever, the quality of data in both regions is problematic, and it will be closely
observed in the empirical section of the thesis. The case of many countries in
Central and Eastern Europe is that under centrally planned regimes, the data
was either inaccurate or useless due to the structural changes in the economy.
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Fiscal dominance
Fiscal stability becomes an important precondition for adopting inflation
targeting especially in emerging markets. In the case of fiscal dominance, the
central bank is under continuous pressure to monetize the government debt,
leading to money growth and high inflation. Under these conditions the goal
of price stability is left aside. Blanchard (2004) explains that an increase in
real interest rates can either make the government debt more attractive and
cause real appreciation, or increase the probability of default and cause real de-
preciation. In the later situation, inflation targeting may not have the desired
results since an increase in real interest rates as a result of high inflation, may
cause real depreciation. Nevertheless, if the government is involved in setting
the inflation target, the regime may have a positive effect in constraining fiscal
policy and weakening the fiscal dominance (Mishkin, 2001).
Economic structure
For a proper control on prices stability, Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005)
suggest that prices should be deregulated and the economy should not be exces-
sively responsive to commodity prices and exchange rates. The administered
prices can make the work of the central bank to control inflation less efficient,
especially in the cases when the decision to administer prices does not take into
account the supply and demand conditions (Khan, 2003).
Transparency and accountability
The central bank should communicate the objective of the monetary policy,
the target inflation, and tools to be used. Generally, central banks publish
regularly a Monetary Policy Report or Inflation Report which includes the ob-
jectives of the monetary policy, decisions taken by the governing body, inflation
target forecasts and comments on the forecasts. Transperancy of the monetary
policy abides the central bank to work hard to stay within the target since a
target breach may cause a loss in credibility, crucial to the expectations man-
agement. This is a new characteristic of a monetary policy framework because
in other regimes, central banks information was considered for internal use and
not made public.
Healthy and developed financial system
A healthy financial system implies a stable banking system and developed
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capital markets which would help keep inflation within target. Many emerging
economies have put a lot of effort in the attempt to improve the conditions of
the financial system.
Nowadays, it is not important if these preconditions exist in the inflation
targeting countries, but to what degree they are fulfilled. Despite the fact that
preconditions are mentioned in almost all studies made on inflation targeting,
it has also been emphasized that inflation targeting can be adopted also when
the degree of meeting these preconditions is low. Batini, Kuttner and Laxton
(2005) conducted a survey among twenty one targeting countries and ten non-
targeting emerging countries to address the importance of preconditions. They
found out that: i) most of the inflation targeting central banks had de jure
instrument independence; ii) most of the countries did not have the proper
forecasting models or capabilities at the adoption of IT; iii) none of the countries
had perfect economic conditions; and iv) most of them scored poorly regarding
the healthiness of the financial and banking system.
1.4 The advantages and disadvantages
Scholars stand divided when it comes to the inflation targeting framework.
Some of them have been supportive and emphasize the importance of inflation
targeting advantages while critics have highlighted the disadvantages of the
framework. Here are presented the most discussed and emphasized advantages
and disadvantages of inflation targeting.
1.4.1 Advantages
The main benefits of inflation targeting are seen to be the following. First,
inflation targeting provides a nominal anchor for the monetary policy and an-
chors expectations faster than other frameworks because it targets inflation
directly not through intermediate targets. Inflation targeting central banks
prepare regular forecasts of inflation for a medium term target horizon, which
show the relationship between current actions of monetary policy and future
goals. Published forecasts and explanations on how the central bank plans
to lead inflation along these projections increase the credibility of the central
bank. As a result, people’s expectations on future inflation are low because
they become more confident that the central banks will achieve the goal of
1. Introduction 9
price stability. Also, it has been pointed out that committing to inflation tar-
get reduces the chances for discretionary monetary policy focusing for example
at an unemployment target at the expense of inflation (Debelle 1997).
Second, inflation targeting offers more flexibility and operating freedom
to central banks since its main focus is to achieve the medium term goal of
inflation target over a specified horizon. This framework leaves room also for
the application of ”discretionary” monetary policy actions, allowing for some
deviations in short term (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). This characteristic of
inflation target can improve the cyclical adjustment of the economy by giving
the central bank more freedom to react to demand and supply shocks (Jonsson,
1999). According to Jonsson (1999), as a reaction to an increase in inflation due
to positive demand shocks, the inflation targeting framework would tighten the
monetary policy to control inflation and increase the output gap. He argues
that other types of policy regimes, would not achieve the same stabilization
effect of these shocks, leading to increase in output and inflation volatility.
Third, the target does not need frequent adjustments under inflation tar-
geting framework. Once the target is set, the final goal of the monetary policy
is defined. King (2005) calls inflation targeting a framework designed for a
world of learning which does not need to be changed each time some aspect
of the economy changes, like it was the case with previous monetary policy
frameworks.
Fourth, in case of failure, inflation targeting has lower economic costs com-
pared to other policy frameworks. Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005) empha-
size the idea that in case of inflation target failure, the costs are only short
term and mainly experienced as temporary high inflation, slower growth, and
higher interest rates. On the other hand, they explain that the cost of failure
of other monetary policy frameworks are high and experienced as high reserve
losses, high inflation, debt problems, and crisis.
1.4.2 Disadvantages
Despite its advantages strongly supported by the inflation target advocates,
its disadvantages have been continuously repeated by critics of inflation tar-
get especially after the 2007 crisis. Two main disadvantages viewing inflation
targeting as: being too rigid and offering too much discretion have been empha-
sized by Bernanke et al. (1999). The argument supporting the high rigidity of
1. Introduction 10
inflation targeting is based on the inflation targeting delayed response to shocks
by monetary policy makers. Similarly, the framework may offer too much dis-
cretion to central banks which do not score highly in terms of credibility.
Both the difficulty to control inflation and the fact that the impact of in-
struments on inflation is given by long and changing lags may weaken the
accountability of the central bank.3 This prevails in emerging markets where
inflation is lowered from high levels and chances of forecast errors or missed tar-
gets are high. In this situation, disinflation prior to adopting inflation targeting
has been recommended continuously also to avoid the fall in credibility.4
Inflation targeting allows for flexibility in exchange rates which may neg-
atively affect the financial system, through their effect in domestic inflation
and interest rates. Some believe that by focusing on price stability as the main
goal, inflation targeting neglects the exchange rate volatility. However, Mishkin
(2000) explains that emerging markets adopting inflation targeting have been
careful not to allow for large movements in exchange rate which would cause
negative effects in dollarized countries. Two ways have been used to limit
flexibility: through putting in place an exchange rate band or through continu-
ous interventions in the foreign exchange. Nevertheless, this process threatens
that exchange rates may become the main anchor which overrules also inflation
targeting.5
Inflation targeting is highly affected by the fiscal policy, which if translated
in long-run fiscal deficits accompanied with high inflation may cause IT to
fail.6 An example of a vicious circle created by the fiscal policy is the situation
where a large amount of public debt may cause for the expectation on higher
future inflation making it more difficult for the central banks to achieve the
target (Debelle, 1997). Also, an increase in interest rates creates a higher
debt burden to the government, resulting in an increase in both interest rates
and debt (Debelle, 1997). Unlike other policy frameworks, inflation targeting
requires frequent assessments of the relationship between the policy instruments
and inflation target, in order for the regime to succeed (Debelle and Lim, 1998).
3Mishkin (2000); Kadiologu, Ozdemir and Yilmaz (2000).
4The first industrialized countries to adopt IT underwent a process of disinflation in the
years prior to adoption of IT. New Zealand experienced disinflation in four years prior to IT
while in UK, disinflation started two years before the adoption. The experience of Canada
is similar.
5Mishkin (2000) suggests that a way to solve it is for the central bank to be transparent
letting the public know that it will allow for fluctuations in exchange rate over some period.
6See Mishkin (2000).
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Moreover, to achieve the target, the central bank must be able to use a policy
instrument without any constraint.
In summary, Pertursson (2005) provides four main points of skepticism re-
garding the implementation of the inflation targeting framework. First, the
framework is considered too rigid and may not allow the central bank to fo-
cus also on other economy events, like growth or business cycles. Second, the
preconditions necessary for inflation targeting are not met in all targeting econ-
omies. However, the author states that a great emphasizes should not be placed
in the preconditions, since for all types of monetary policies, there are neces-
sary preconditions. Third, central banks do not have a good control of inflation
due to the transmission lags in the framework, fiscal policy, monetary policy
in other countries, and different shocks. Fourth, the necessity to suppress the
exchange rate fluctuations in the open economy targeters may switch the focus
of the central bank from achieving price stability through inflation targeting to
the exchange rate development, making the exchange rate the most important
nominal anchor.
1.5 Designing inflation targeting framework
When designing the inflation target framework, both institutional framework
and target framework should be taken into consideration. The institutional
framework informs the public on the central bank’s decision on inflation, and
allows for a close monitoring of the central bank’s performance. The target
framework includes the process of deciding the following parameters: target
level, horizon, measure and type. These parameters may vary across central
banks and also across time.
1.5.1 Institutional framework
Assigning the target
The question of which institution assigns the target has been closely associated
with the independence of central bank. However, the central bank indepen-
dence can be classified in three types: goal, target and instrument indepen-
dence. Goal independence is the freedom to set the monetary policy objectives,
but is not common among central banks (Debelle and Fischer, 1994). However,
there are countries in which the target is determined by the government and
central bank jointly, and other countries where the target is determined either
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by the government or the central bank.7 In a survey conducted by Tuladhar
(2005), it was observed that in five countries the target was set by the govern-
ment, in eight countries the target was set jointly and in eight cases target was
set by the central bank.8 On the other hand, in all countries, central bank had
full instrument independence to meet the targets. In the sample of targeting
countries in this thesis, four central banks decide the target together with the
government, and other six decide it on their own (Table 1.2).
Contrary to the idea that government intervention in assigning the tar-
get may harm the independence of the central bank, the cooperation between
these institutions has positive impact on the commitment of the government
to achieve the target by a supportive fiscal policy (Roger and Stone, 2005).
Debelle and Fischer (1994) advocate the central bank to be goal dependent,
having the government set the goals, but have instrument independence and
total freedom in defining the monetary policy actions.
Inflation targeting and other goals
Under inflation targeting framework the main goal is price stability but any
other goal in conform to price stability is achievable. Inflation targeting is
inconsistent with fixed exchange rate regime, but consistent with employment
goal and financial stability (Debelle, 1997). This inconsistency with the fixed
exchange rate is straightforward since under fixed exchange rate, the monetary
policy loses its autonomy and makes it difficult to target inflation. However,
the goal of full employment is a desired objective of the monetary policy in
the long run, but in the short run, there may exist inflation targeting policy
responses which may be not be consistent with full employment.
Decision making
When designing the decision-making structure of an inflation targeting cen-
tral bank, two matters should be taken into consideration (Heenan, Peter and
Roger, 2006). The first issue is the degree of inclusion of the supervisory board
7Hammond (2012) points out that in 15 out of 27 inflation targeting countries, the target
is determined by the government and central bank jointly, in 9 countries the target is set
by the central bank, and in 3 countries it is set by the government. He states that among
industrialized countries, only in Sweden the government is not involved in this process.
8In general, emerging markets are observed to enjoy more independence in determining
the target, but Hammond 2012 argues that this is only de jure independence but de facto
the picture is different and the government influences the decisions of the central bank. The
examples of Colombia and Guatemala, the target is set by the central bank, but the Minister
of Finance is a member of the decision making board.
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of the bank in the process of designing and implementing monetary policy. The
second issue is related to the composition of the decision making committee.
The inclusion of the supervisory board shows the commitment of the board
to a successful framework. Generally, a monetary policy committee is created
in the central bank, taking decisions based on information available, ensuring
that the decision is not centered on a single person (Roger and Stone, 2005).
The composition of the committee, the frequency of meeting and the decision
making system differ from bank to bank showing that there is no general rule
in place (Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Decision making in inflation targeters
External Internal 
Albania Supervisory Council 7 2 Vote 13
Armenia Bank Board 0 7 Vote 12
Czech Republic Bank Board 0 7 Vote 8
Georgia Bank Board 0 12 Vote 12
Hungary Monetary Council 4 3 Vote 12
Moldova Council of Administration 0 3 Vote 12
Poland Monetary Council 9 1 Vote 12
Romania Bank Board 5 4 Vote 8
Serbia Bank Board 0 4 Vote 12
Turkey Monetary Policy Committee 1 6 Vote 12





Source: Hammond (2012) and Central Banks
Transparency and accountability
As already mentioned inflation targeting central banks should be accountable
and transparent to the public for actions taken to achieve targeted inflation.
The form of accountability changes to whether inflation is within or outside
the target. In case inflation is within the target, the central bank states the
inflation developments in the inflation report and explains the necessary steps
to keep inflation within target level (Roger and Stone, 2005). However, in case
inflation is outside the target, the central bank explains in details the reasons
why the target was missed and proposes the necessary actions to bring inflation
back to the target.
In addition, central banks should set a communication plan as part of the
inflation targeting framework. Transparency gains more importance in infla-
tion targeting compared to other regimes, since the public has to monitor the
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central bank despite the lags between monetary policy actions and inflation
results (Roger and Stone, 2005). A general convergence is observed among
targeting central banks. Most of them publish the monetary policy framework,
objectives, analysis on macroeconomic situations, and inflation development.
Table 1.3 shows the different forms of communication and transparency level
of the central banks in the study. Press releases to communicate monetary
policy decisions, minutes of meeting and inflation report are common in almost
all countries. However, the composition of votes is usually not made public
although knowing the balance of votes is considered a good indicator for the
public to know the general view of the policymakers within the board.
Table 1.3: Transparency in central banks
Country Press 
release/conference
Minutes Votes published Inflation report (frequency)
Albania yes yes no Monetary Policy Report (quarterly)
Armenia yes yes no yes, quarterly
Czech Republic yes yes unanimous, majority yes, quarterly
Georgia yes yes no yes, quarterly
Hungary yes yes yes yes, quarterly
Moldova yes yes unanimous, majority yes quarterly
Poland yes yes yes yes, three times
Romania yes no no yes,quarterly
Serbia yes no no yes, quarterly
Turkey yes yes no yes, quarterly
Source: Hammond (2012) and Central Banks
1.5.2 Target framework
The target level
No consensus or specific rule exists regarding the level of the target. In the-
ory, optimal level of inflation rate to ensure price stability is either zero or
negative. However, in practice, positive levels of inflation rates are favored
because usually the measured inflation rate is slightly higher than actual in-
flation; therefore a zero measured inflation rate would imply negative actual
inflation.9 More importantly, in times of financial crisis, in a environment of
9Svensson (1998) is more specific in defining that the quantitative target should be be-
tween 1.5 and 2.5% per year, with a band plus/minus 1 percentage point around the target.
He explains also that no defined rule on how to set the instrument is required by the CB.
Meanwhile Fisher (1996) recommends an average rate of annual inflation of 2% with tolerance
range of±1pp.
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zero inflation rates, the central bank would not be able to decrease the interest
rates since this condition does not allow the real interest rate to fall below zero
(Debelle, 1997). In addition, the zero inflation target suggested by the theory
may cause deflationary periods which are usually more costly than inflationary
periods since they negatively affect economic and financial system (Hammond,
2012).
It is advised that when deciding the target level, central banks account for
some flexibility in order to respond to different short term shocks caused to
the economy. Choosing between narrow and wide bandwidth seems to release
information regarding the characteristics of the monetary policy. A wide band
implies loose monetary policy while a narrow band would be caused by tight
monetary policy and run the risk of missed targets. Generally, the developed
countries have centered the inflation target on 2% (between 1% and 3%), while
developing countries do not show a clear pattern of the inflation level. It
is commonly accepted that developing countries have a higher target but no
empirical evidence exist to support the most suitable inflation target for these
countries.
Table 1.4 provides a chronology of the inflation target levels and types
announced by the central banks of the inflation targeting countries under study.
The general trend of emerging countries is to start by setting a high initial target
and lower it continuously during a period called ’convergence period’10, to arrive
at stable medium term targets. Among the three countries which adopted
inflation target first, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, it is observed that
they first adopted a target above the low 2% level of industrial countries. The
upper bounds set by Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary were 6.5%, 7.8% and 8.
Similarly, Romania started from a target of 7.5%±1. Unlike the general trend
observed, Turkey started with a target of 5% but by 2009 due to crisis adjusted
its target to a higher rate of 7.5%. A similar path is observed for Serbia.
However, the latest countries to adopt inflation target are Albania, Georgia
and Moldova. Coming from a period of prior disinflation and preparation for
inflation target, Albania’s first medium term target was 3%±1pp. Georgia and
Moldova, on the other hand, set higher medium term targets.
Target horizon
The target horizon is the necessary period for the monetary policy to ensure
that the inflation returns to the preannounced target by the central bank.
10See Mishkin and Hebbel (2007).
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Poland Hungary Romania Turkey Armenia Serbia Albania Georgia Moldova
1997
1998 5.5% - 6.5%
1999 4% - 5% 6.4%-7.8%
2000 3.5% - 5.5% 5.4%-6.8%
2001 2% - 4% 6%-8% 7% ±1 
2002 5%±1 4.5% ±1
2003 3%±1 3.5% ±1
2004 2.5%±1 3.5% ±1
2005 2.5%±1 4% ±1 7.5% ±1 
2006 3.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3.5% ±1 5.0% ±1 5% 3% 7%-9%
2007 3.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3% 4.0% ±1 4% 3% 4%-8%
2008 3.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3% 3.8% ±1  4% 4%±1.5 2%-4%
2009 3.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3% 3.5% ±1 7,50% 4%±1.5 8%±2 3%±1 9%
2010 2.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3% 3.5% ±1 6,50% 4%±1.5 6%±2 3%±1 6% 5%±1
2011 2.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3% 3.0% ±1 5,50% 4%±1.5 4.5%±1.5 3%±1 6% 5%±1
2012 2.0% ±1 2.5%±1 3% 3.0% ±1  5% 4%±1.5 4%±1.5 3%±1 6% 5%±1
band 
(3% - 5%) - 
(2% - 4%)
Source: Central Banks
Selecting an appropriate horizon is crucial since it determines the response of
the monetary policy to inflationary or deflationary shocks which may cause
inflation deviation from the target. Under a short horizon, inflation turns to
target rather fast but at an expense of interest volatility. While a long horizon
does not increase the interest rate volatility but inflation does not reach target
quickly and deviation from target is more persistent. However, a short inflation
targeting horizon is perceived as a signal of commitment of the central bank
to achieve inflation targeting at a short time, while the long inflation target
horizon signals that inflation target would take more time to be achieved. Short
horizon implies higher volatility of output and financial variables compared to
long horizon (Freedman and Otker-Robe, 2010).
Batini and Nelson (2000) define two ways to deal with the inflation target
horizon depending on the modeling of inflation targeting framework: optimal
policy horizon, when the policy is presented by a simple feedback rule on ex-
pected future inflation and optimal feedback horizon, when the policy is pre-
sented by an optimal rule for the instrument. They find out that the optimal
inflation targeting horizon is medium term, implying that the central bank’s
response to shocks should be a gradual process and not an immediate one. The
medium term target allows for some degree of flexibility and missing targets
in the short term during periods of economic shocks. For economies under a
process of disinflation, the horizon needs to be longer in order to increase the
accountability and credibility of the central bank. Table 1.5 shows that the
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target horizon in all inflation targeting countries is medium term, as suggested
by literature.
Table 1.5: Target type, measure and horizon
Countries Target set by Target measure Target type Target horizon 
Albania CB CPI point with band medium term
Armenia Gov + CB CPI point with band medium term
Czech Republic CB CPI point with band medium term
Georgia* CB CPI point medium term
Hungary CB CPI point medium term
Moldova CB CPI point with band medium term
Poland CB CPI point with band medium term
Romania Gov + CB CPI point with band medium term
Serbia Gov + CB CPI point with band medium term
Turkey Gov + CB CPI point with band three years
Source: : Hammond (2012) and Central Banks
*Georgia: the target set by the CB but approved by the parliament
Gov - Government; CB - Central Bank; CPI - Headline
Measure of inflation rate
Defining the inflation target measure is an important step in the inflation target
framework design. A general trend in inflation targeting economies is observed
towards using headline CPI, as also noticed in the sample of countries in this
thesis (Table 1.5). Headline CPI was chosen over GDP deflator and core head-
line for the following reasons. Compared to GDP deflator, headline CPI is
practical, easier to grasp by the public, and available on monthly basis. More-
over, compared to GDP deflator, it is available in shorter lags and not revised
frequently.
Therefore, the choice remains between headline inflation (CPI) or core infla-
tion (CPI without some specific commodities in the consumer basket with high
volatile prices, e.g. food and energy).11 Because core CPI is less volatile than
headline CPI, many central banks decide to calculate both measures but to pub-
lish headline CPI only since it is easily understood by the public.12 However,
from the point of view of central bank, they prefer to measure core inflation to
11See Mishkin (2007).
12For the period 1997-2002, Czech Republic measured inflation by ’net inflation’ which
was calculated as the changes in the prices of the unregulated items in the consumer basket,
accounting for changes in indirect taxes and subsidy elimination (Czech National Bank).
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be able to divide inflationary signals and short term noise caused by the non-
monetary shocks As a result, many central banks decide to announce headline
CPI as a measure of inflation, but this is only as an operational tool in the
inflation target framework, and they continuously monitor inflation through
other forms apart from headline CPI.
Mishkin (2007) emphasizes the importance of a careful response of monetary
policy to changes in headline inflation, since they run the risk of responding
to temporary fluctuations in inflation rather than to permanent ones. His
main example is that of a temporary increase in the price of energy which is
naturally temporary and eventually prices will decline, keeping average inflation
at the same level. If the central bank does not distinguish this as a temporary
shock, it might decide to tighten its monetary policy and decrease inflation
rate and unemployment. Since the monetary policy actions take time to be
implemented in the real economic life, the fall in inflation and unemployment
will drop them below trends. The unwanted result is considerable fluctuations
in both unemployment and prices. Also in the case when the supply shock
becomes permanent, headline inflation will increase until the increase in the
price level of the commodity stops, and then will return to its underlying trend
rate.
Type of target
Inflation target can be announced in different forms: range, point target, or
point target with tolerance band. Target range allows for the target to move
around a specified band and is adopted by countries which foresee doubts in
hitting the target. These economies cannot have a good control of the infla-
tion rate through inflation targeting framework and therefore allow for some
accommodation of short term shocks to price level. From the sample of infla-
tion targeting countries, the initial targets set by Czech Republic, Poland, and
Serbia were range targets and the same form was kept for three to four years.
Meanwhile, point target specifies a numerical target and is mainly used by
countries which want to focus their inflation expectations. Being very specific
in setting the target, the central bank sends a clear message to the public re-
garding its goals, allowing also for a better assessment of its performance. This
type of target makes sense in the medium term inflation targeting horizon, since
in point targeting, missing monthly targets is common. This type of continu-
ous inflation targeting is usually set for a period of 3-5 years and afterwards
revised. An example of point target is Poland, which for the period 1999-2003
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announced a target of 4 percent in medium term13 and only in 2004 switched
to point target of 2.5% with a band±1pp. Turkey, on the other hand, has is-
sued point targets all along its experience with inflation targeting. In addition,
Hungary is an example of point target 3% in the medium term, since 2005,
after some period of yearly point target with tolerance band. Also, Georgia’s
target defined for 2012 and 2013 is set on 6% point target.
Commonly used is the point target with a tolerance band. Romania’s initial
inflation target announced was point target of 7.5 percent with tolerance band
of±1pp and through years continued to maintain this form of target but lowered
the point to 3 percent keeping the same band in 2011. Armenia started initially
with point target, and moved towards point target of 4% with a tolerance
band±1.5pp. On the other hand, Albania announced from the start a point
target of 3% with tolerance band±1pp. Meanwhile, Czech National Bank has
an experience with different forms of inflation target. Initially, it announced
its inflation target as a range target from 5.5 percent to 6.5 percent in 1998,
to a range between 2 and 4 percent in 2001. For the period December 2002-
Decembet 2005, CNB set in April 2001 a target band of 3-5% (January 2002
was the starting target month). The band ended in December 2005, with a
target level 2%-4% level. Later on, CNB changed again its target form for the
period January 2006 - December 2009, to point inflation 3% with a tolerance
band±1pp. Last change made was effective in January 2010, to a point target
2% with tolerance band±1pp.14
As of 2012, (Figure 1.1) out of ten inflation targeting countries in the sample,
two use point target, while the other eight use point with band target.
Figure 1.1: Types of inflation targets in 2012
Source: Central Banks
13Poland also announced yearly short term targets during this period, in order to assure a





Since a growing number of countries have adopted inflation targeting shows
that it may be a better policy compared to the other monetary frameworks
like money target, exchange rate target or some other framework with multiple
objectives. In this section, the features of the two other regimes widely used
before inflation target are presented and analyzed, providing a comparison of
advantages and disadvantages of these regimes.
2.1 Exchange rate targeting
Exchange rate targeting is a monetary policy framework which aims to achieve
exchange rate stability relative to an anchor currency via two channels: changes
in interest rates and interventions in direct foreign exchange. There exist three
general types of exchange rate targets: fixed exchange rate, soft peg and floating
exchange rate.1 Under fixed exchange rate, the commitment to use a foreign
currency as an anchor is institutionalized in the form of a currency board,
monetary union or official dollarization.2 Soft peg is a relatively more flexible
form and allows for a country to peg its currency to a foreign one either as
1IMF provides a more detailed classification of exchange rate regimes into the following
types: exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender, currency board arrangements,
conventional fixed peg arrangements, pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands, crawl-
ing pegs, exchange rates within crawling bands, managed floating with no predetermined
path for the exchange rate, and independently floating.
2A currency board is a monetary authority bound to keep the domestic currency at a
fixed exchange rate with an anchor foreign currency. Official dollarization requires the use
of another country’s currency as domestic currency. Monetary unions include a group of
countries which decide to discard their national currencies and adopt a new one.
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a crawling peg, which allows the peg to move over time, or as an exchange
rate band, which allows the central bank to change exchange rates within a
defined band (Fischer 2001). The most flexible form of exchange rate regime
is floating exchange rates which allows for the central bank to be independent
when setting monetary policy.
Exchange rate targeting is seen as the process of importing credibility by
fixing the exchange rate of the domestic currency to the currency of a coun-
try experiencing low inflation in order to bring the inflation of the domestic
country to the low levels of the anchor country, which facilitates international
investment and trade. An important advantage of this framework is that it
is easily understood by the public and may lead to some kind of integration
(mainly economic but also political).3
Petursson (2000) explains three main advantages of the fixed exchange rate
regime. First, by ensuring a stable currency, fixed exchange rate regime is char-
acterized by an increase in credibility, which in a free capital flows environment
is accompanied by lower transaction costs. Second, using a foreign currency
as an anchor increases the transparency and credibility of the central bank,
lowering inflation level. Third, fixed exchange rate regime reduces the herd
behavior existent in the foreign exchange markets and has a positive impact in
the economic stability.
However, the successfulness of the exchange rate target depends on two
factors: on the credibility of the anchor country and the external shocks effects
on the domestic currency. In this aspect, several drawbacks of this regime are
observed. The loss in monetary policy independence to the anchor country is
considered the main disadvantage of the regime. Under these circumstances,
the central bank is not able to act in response to shocks within the country
and economic shocks in the country to whose currency the home currency
is pegged to. Also, as a result of the general belief that under exchange rate
target, the currency risk is minimized, some room is left for un-hedged currency
mismatches which are usually accompanied by financial and debt crisis (Battini,
Kuttner and Laxton, 2005). In addition, the weight of achieving a successful
exchange rate target falls on domestic prices which are translated as an effect
on output (Battini, Kuttner and Laxton, 2005).
More importantly, a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and
monetary independence create a trio which is inconsistent and may give rise to
currency crisis (Obstfeld, 1998). The likelihood of this regime causing a crisis
3An example of this is the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
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is higher in emerging markets due to liability structure composed of short term
and denominated in foreign currency instruments while the income is received
in domestic currency. Examples of a crisis due to home currency losing value in
exchange rate frameworks happened in Latin America, East Asia and Russia
in the 1990s.4 Attracted by high domestic interest rates, fixed exchange rate
regime, and capital mobility, a large volume of foreign investments entered
these regions but at some point, this capital flow stopped, causing an increase
in uncertainty, and a reversal move of the capital flow from in to out of these
countries. As a result, the level of foreign reserves declined and the domestic
currencies lost their values.
Analyzing the causes and impacts of the crisis of exchange rate regimes,
some economists support the Bipolar View or the so-called the two corner
solution, which argues that only the two extreme types of exchange rate systems
can be considered stable: the free floating exchange rate system, and the fixed
exchange rate regime. However, in the 1990s, because of the crisis, the general
trend was to move away from the fixed exchange rate regimes, to more flexible
ones.
2.2 Money targeting
Money targeting was first adopted in the late 1970s by developed countries
like US, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan but in the 1980s and 1990s became
popular in both developed and developing countries. The money targeting
framework is focused on targeting the growth rate of one or more monetary
aggregates as an intermediate goal to control inflation.5 It assumes that a spe-
cific growth rate of a monetary aggregate can be achieved when the relationship
between the monetary aggregates and price level is stable. The choice of which
money aggregate to target is the most difficult faced by the central banks,
since many central banks experience difficulties in properly managing the cho-
sen monetary aggregates (The Czech National Bank). The regime is built on
the two main assumptions that: i) the monetary base can be controlled by the
central bank and ii) the velocity of the money aggregate should be stable or
easily predictable in its relationship with other macroeconomic variables.
4Examples of countries pegging home currency to a foreign one, and going into a crisis:
Mexico (1997), Asia (1997), Turkey (2001), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Ecuador (1999).
5Friedman in 1968 revisited the Quantity Theory of Money which explains the stable
relationship between money supply and price level.
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A positive feature of this framework is that data is easily obtainable and
available in short term. Since money supply is much more easily controllable
than inflation, this data becomes a good indicator of short term inflation (Ba-
tini, Kuttner and Laxton, 2005). In addition, the analysis and interpretation
required by the regime on economic performance are simple and based on easy
obtainable data
However, one of the drawbacks of the framework is the fact that it compli-
cates the process of targeting inflation by using a second number money target.
Since this process makes the assessment of the central bank’s performance very
difficult, it is argued that money targets do not work well in economies with lit-
tle credibility in central banks. In addition, as mentioned above, money target
is based on the assumption that money velocity is predictable, but experi-
ence has shown that targets are not always met which shattered the people’s
credibility in the central bank (Batini, Kuttner and Laxton, 2005). Since the
parameters affecting the demand for money are usually unstable in case of fi-
nancial liberalization, this intermediate target is not a good predictor of future
inflation (Agenor, 2012).
Another drawback of money targeting is that it needs to be adjusted fre-
quently due to changes in the money demand function causing changes in the
relationship between money growth and inflation (Debelle and Lim, 1998).
Therefore, it is generally believed that money targeting is not a good frame-
work for emerging countries, mainly because it requires a stable relationship
between money aggregate and inflation.6 Although money target offers a nom-
inal anchor, it failed as a result of the instable relationship between monetary
aggregates and inflation.
Despite the above mentioned drawbacks, Mishkin (2002) explains that the
money targeting framework is known for being successful in the case of Ger-
many and Switzerland. However, the framework applied in these two countries
is more flexible than the regular one. It includes announcing the monetary
policy, aiming at the long term goals, and controlling inflation. These central
banks allowed for a considerable degree of flexibility in the framework after a
considerable experience with unstable relationship between monetary aggregate
and inflation. Mishkin highlights that the main elements that make this kind
of money target different from the usual one are, flexibility, transparency and
accountability, which are also the core preconditions of the inflation targeting
regime.




3.1 What is dollarization
Dollarization is known as the process during which one country decides to
replace (fully or partially) its own currency with a foreign currency in its main
basic roles. In early literature, the dollarization process was mainly connected
to the role of money as mean of exchange, and dollarization was also known
as currency substitution. With time, it was observed that the foreign currency
in circulation declined while the assets and liabilities held in foreign currency
increased. Therefore, a new term financial dollarization was introduced to refer
to the substitution of the store of value role of home currency, with the foreign
currency (Castro, Moron, 2005).1
By late 1990s, after the event of Asian crisis, the new concept of liability
dollarization was introduced to emphasize the impact of foreign currency bor-
rowing on the exposure of developing countries to external shocks (Reinhart.
et al, 2003). A more limited type of dollarization is the ’real dollarization’,
understood as the use of the foreign currency for price and wage contracts.2 In
the sample of countries under study, Kosovo and Montenegro moved from unof-
ficial dollarization during a period of lack of sovereignty, to official dollarization
after the formation of new states.3 Before the dissolution of the political entity
1Despite the term ’dollarization’, the foreign currency can be dollars or any other currency.
2Plata and Herrero (2007) explain that at first, literature on partial dollarization was
focused mainly on the asset substitution, when the public holds foreign currency assets.
After the crisis in Asia (1998) and Argentina (2002), the literature switched focus to liability
substitution.
3They moved from using Deutche mark to Euro, without being part of the currency union.
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they belonged, both Kosovo and Montenegro experienced ’complete and non
endorsed loss of sovereignty’ while after sovereignty was gained, they moved to
’complete and endorsed loss of sovereignty’ (Minda, 2005).
Generally, measuring dollarization is not considered easy and simple due to
the lack of the necessary data to calculate the foreign currency in circulation.
However asset substitution can be measured as the ratio of foreign currency
deposits to total deposits or broad money, while liability substitution is mea-
sured as the ratio of foreign currency loans to total loans. It is important to
emphasize that measuring dollarization for a large period in the sample of coun-
tries from both regions of Central and East Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States, remains challenging. Reporting strategies in most of
these central banks have changed many times also due to transition process
from being centrally planned economies to market economies and continuous
data are difficult to be found. Moreover, some of them are new states and lack
data before a central bank was created there. Having in mind that deposit
dollarization and loan dollarization mirror each other and one can be viewed
as proxy for the other, as previously argued by Levy Yeyati (2006), the current
author of this thesis calculated the deposit dollarization for the twenty nine
countries in the sample, in a time span from 1997 to 2011.
Figure 3.14 presents the average deposit dollarization level for the period
(2006-2011) for both inflation targeting and non-targeting economies in the
sample. At first glance, it becomes obvious that deposit dollarization has not
hit all the countries equally and the heterogeneity in the sample makes the study
of inflation targeting in this group interesting. Moreover, no clear distinction
in the level of deposit dollarization between inflation targeting countries and
non-targeting can be made. Using a suggestion by Plata and Herrero (2007)
to classify countries with low, moderate and high dollarization, it is noticed
that only Czech Republic and Slovakia have a low degree of deposit dollariza-
tion of below 18%. Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Turkey,
Slovenia, and Romania have a moderate degree of deposit dollarization under
40%, and all the remaining seventeen countries have a high degree of deposit
dollarization. Among the inflation targeting countries, Georgia, Serbia and Ar-
menia have considerably high level of dollarization, followed by Albania, Turkey
and Moldova with a lower degree of deposit dollarization but still above the
40% level. A difference is viewed in the first three countries to adopt infla-
4Deposit dollarization calculated as the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits.
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tion targeting, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, with the lowest degree of
dollarization among inflation targeters.
Figure 3.1: Average deposit dollarization 2006-2011
Source: National Banks
Kosovo and Montenegro are considered to be fully dollarized 100%
Due to the importance of the financial dollarization, it is necessary to ob-
serve its causes. One of the main sources of dollarization is the increase in
globalization and openness of financial markets, which is considered positive
for trade and competition. In addition, dollarization may reach high values in
economies with experiences of high inflation, lost trust in home currency, cur-
rency devaluations, fiscal deficits or illegal trade (Berg and Borensztein, 2000).
In the first case dollarization is considered positive, while in the second case
it may be followed by instability. All these causes are clearly linked with the
countries in the sample having a moderate and high degree of dollarization.
The main advantages of dollarization are considered to be: lower transac-
tion costs and higher involvement in the international markets. On the other
hand, the disadvantages of dollarization are considered loss in monetary policy
autonomy and seigniorage, a need for strict fiscal policy adoption, and vulner-
ability of the banking system (Berg and Borensztein, 2000). More importantly,
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high level of dollarization has a negative impact on the vulnerability of the fi-
nancial systems, observed mainly after the crisis in Mexico, Asia, East Europe
and Argentina. Dollarization increases the chances for exposure of the econo-
mies to solvency and liquidity risks (De Nicolo et al., 2003). The main source
of the solvency risk is high depreciation accompanied by currency mismatches,
which affects the balance sheets of banks through the loan portfolio or the open
foreign exchange position (De Nicolo et al, 2003). The later is understood as
the attempt of the banks to keep a balance foreign currency position by giving
foreign currency loans to people whose income is denominated in local cur-
rency. Liquidity risk is the result of the inclusion of a risk premium on foreign
currency deposits, as depositors have low confidence in banks supplying foreign
currency liquidity when needed. In case the banks decide to supply local cur-
rency in exchange for the foreign one, the floating exchange rate regime would
bring considerable loss to depositors under currency depreciation.5
3.2 The implication of dollarization in monetary
policy
The increase presence of a foreign currency, taking over part of the roles played
by the domestic currency, is bound to affect the monetary policy. It is argued
that dollarization makes the process of setting a monetary policy target more
difficulty, since policy makers should be careful to properly include the foreign
currency element in their analysis and decision making. As a result of low
costs to switch from domestic to foreign currency in the face of high inflation,
dollarization may cause an increase in the volatility of money demand and the
volatility of exchange rate (Plata and Herrero, 2007). The literature has not
been able to provide a full picture of the effects of dollarization on monetary
policy. However, here are presented some of the results of several studies on the
impact of dollarization on inflation, output, and exchange rate pass through.
The relationship between dollarization and inflation is not clear to define.
Emerging economies experienced increase in dollarization level especially during
periods of hyperinflation and economic instability, when the public lost trust
in the domestic currency but even after inflation was lowered, dollarization did
not decrease in these countries (Plata and Herrero, 2007). Figure 3.2 shows
the deposit dollarization and inflation development in the inflation targeting
5See De Nicolo (2003).
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countries in the sample for the period 1997-2011. Despite achieving low levels
of inflation, the level of dollarization did not decrease. Following this line, it
is difficult to argue that dollarization has become an obstacle on the process
of achieving stable prices, since inflation has lowered in all these dollarized
countries.
The persistence of the financial dollarization even when inflation is lowered
is explained by Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998) by the fact that exchange rate
volatility may have decreased at least as much as the volatility of inflation and
may be characterized as fear of floating. Another cause for persistence has been
pointed out to be the decrease in credibility on the monetary regime, and fear
of expected high inflation. A classic example is the hard peg, under which the
choice of people to hold foreign currency deposits depends on their expectations
of how will monetary policy be administered in case of a collapse, despite the
low chances of this happening (De Nicolo et al, 2003). It is important to
highlight that the degree of dollarization did not have any effect neither on the
duration of the disinflation period nor on the output growth performance of
the economies (Reinhart et al, 2003).
Chances of debt defaults combined with moral hazard may result in high
dollarization, under the condition that both borrowers and lenders believe that
the government will bail them out in case of a large depreciation, and do not
account for the risks of foreign currency borrowing (Nicolo et. al, 2003). Thus,
the commitment to stable exchange rate becomes a necessity for the monetary
policy in dollarized countries.
Evaluating the impact of dollarization through an exchange rate shock to
inflation, in order to assess the relevance to monetary policy, Plata and Her-
rero (2007) conclude that the price increase is much smaller on moderately
dollarized countries compared to highly dollarized ones. Also, countries with
a high degree of dollarization experience high and significant exchange rate
pass-through compared to low dollarized countries.
Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) state that balance sheet effects affect the banking
sector and may lead to bankruptcy. The local banks are financed by foreign
currency deposits or borrowing and due to several rules finance the foreign
currency as loans to individual borrowers whose income is denominated in
local currency. In case of exchange rate depreciation, this currency mismatch
becomes dangerous because the value of foreign currency liabilities increases,
and the chances of loans not to be repaid are higher. This situation led to the
crisis in Turkey (2000), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2002). Chances of debt
3. Dollarization and inflation targeting 29
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defaults combined with moral hazard may result in high dollarization, under
the condition that both borrowers and lenders believe that the government will
bail them out in case of a large depreciation, and do not account for the risks
of foreign currency borrowing (Nicolo et. al, 2003). Thus, the commitment to
stable exchange rate becomes a necessity for the monetary policy in dollarized
countries.
Two main difficulties created by dollarization are the following (Leiderman
et al, 2006). First, since the balance sheets of the companies in dollarized econ-
omies are composed of debts in foreign currencies, while their receipts are in
local currency, the balance sheets become exposed to the changes in nominal
and real exchange rates that happen under inflation targeting. Secondly, in dol-
larized economies, the exchange rate may have a higher pass-through to prices
and the balance sheet effect would cause for devaluations. This is contrary to
the standard transmission mechanism, which implies that a depreciation of real
exchange rates would have a positive impact on output.6
In literature, the ’fear of floating’ is generally associated with dollarization,
implying that economies are more vulnerable to exchange rate volatility fearing
that changes in exchange rate may negatively affect balance sheets and output
(Reinhart.et. al, 2003). This reaction has clear implication in the conduct of
monetary policy, but does not imply that monetary policy becomes inefficient in
achieving price stability. Answering the question whether dollarization should
be discouraged or not, Balino et al, (1999) explain that it depends on the role
that dollarization plays in the economy. If it comes as a result of the globaliza-
tion and openness of the financial markets, it should be welcomed. However,
if caused as a result of macroeconomic instability and weak financial markets,
dollarization may further complicate the situation as a result of measures taken
to strengthen the domestic currency.
3.3 Inflation target and dollarization
When implementing inflation targeting in dollarized countries, a specific focus
on the monetary policy analysis should be given to the relationship of dollariza-
tion and the ultimate target. As pointed out in Mishkin (2000), dollarization
may create problems to a successful implementation of inflation targeting espe-
cially in emerging markets. Mishkin (2000) argues that since inflation targeting
6Argument made by Leiderman et al 2006.
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allows for flexible exchange rate, any depreciation may decrease the value of
balance sheets for firms, households and banks, increase the weight of for-
eign currency denominated debt, and create problems for the financial markets
pushing them towards crisis.
However, other studies have a positive outlook regarding the suitability of
inflation targeting regime in a dollarized economy. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003)’s
findings show that fully fledged inflation targeting, which allows free floating
exchange rates within the confines set by the target, would lower financial dol-
larization by increasing the attractiveness of the domestic currency relative to
the foreign one. However, they highlight the idea that unless both price and
wages denominated in foreign currency, and the pass through of exchange rate
are at moderate levels, the scope of keeping low inflation and volatile exchange
rates (under inflation targeting) would not have an impact in decreasing finan-
cial dollarization.
De Nicolo et al (2003) explain that the best monetary policy regime in
dollarized economies would be to target inflation directly and allow free floating.
The authors recommend that this process should be gradual, to limit at first
the fluctuations in the exchange rate in order to allow for strengthening the
credibility. They believe that inflation targeting is accompanied by a decrease
in the level of dollarization, but argue that continuous reforms are needed for
de-dollarization and strengthening of the domestic currency. Moreoever, trying
to assess whether inflation target can be achieved in a dollarized economy,
Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2008) arrives at three important conclusions.
First, the conduct of monetary policy in a dollarized economy can become more
challenging, but it can be successful at low cost, in case of an inflation targeting
central bank. Second, smoothing the exchange rate is important even when the
degree of dollarization is defined endogenously by the monetary policy reaction
to exchange rate. Also, it is pointed out the fact that countries with credibility
problems may benefit from partial dollarization, since it forces the monetary
policy to be stricter. Third, the recommended exchange rate smoothing lowers
the probability for multiple equilibria.
However, the design and adoption of inflation targeting regime in a dol-
larized economy has to have different characteristics from the non-dollarized
ones (Armas and Grippa, 2005).7 The differences lie in the target, forecasting
process and the way the central bank manages the risks coming from dollariza-
7Their study focuses on the Peruvian case, since Peru was a highly dollarized economy at
the time of IT adoption.
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tion. Nevertheless, no clear requirement regarding the level of dollarization at
adoption has been observed until now. Figure 3.3 shows the inflation targeting
countries in the sample and the levels of both deposit and loan dollarization at
year of adoption. However, some kind of symmetry between loan and deposit
dollarization is noticeable, but every country had different level of both deposit
and loan dollarization at the year of adoption. The spread of countries along
the line from low to high levels of dollarization shows that no clear rule or trend
is observed regarding the proper degree of dollarization at adoption.
Figure 3.3: Loan and deposit dollarization at adoption
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Before performing an empirical study on the inflation targeting countries in
the sample, it is necessary to briefly highlight the rationale for adoption and
the reasons why the previous regimes failed. Further, this section presents also
a general inflation and GDP performance and a target performance in each
country.
4.1 Rationale for IT adoption
Albania
Emerging from a closed communist regime, Albania experienced an increase in
inflation in early 90s, which was brought down to one digit levels by a monetary
aggregate regime by mid-90s. Albania decided to switch to inflation targeting
framework for the following three reasons. First, having achieved price stability
with the help of monetary policy framework, Albania was facing a situation
defined by Estrella and Mishkin (1997) as a low inflation environment where the
monetary aggregates fail to communicate information due to increased noise
in velocity shocks (Luci, 2007). In this respect, inflation targeting seemed
an appropriate substitute. Second, it was deemed necessary by the central
bank to replace the IMF program targets with a nominal anchor like inflation
targeting.1 Third, inflation targeting was viewed by the central bank as a
complex regime which would increase incentives for all the economic players,
making the government aware that the success of the regime depended on its
commitment also.
Albania adopted inflation targeting in 2009, but its preparations for the
1Fullani (2008).
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new framework started in 2004 by improving the institutional structure and
analytical resources. Several forums were organized during this period with
the participation and feedback from representatives of targeting central banks.
Average inflation reached one digit levels in 1995 but increased sharply again
during the pyramid schemes in 1997.
After a stabilization program put
in place, inflation fell again.
Since 2001, average inflation was
around the target value of 3%
while unlike other countries, eco-
nomic growth during the crisis
































Albania-GDP growth ! CEE-GDP growth !
after IT adoption!
Inflation and GDP growth performance
Armenia
One of the reasons, the Central Bank of Armenia moved away from money
targeting was the high dollarization of the economy. Due to continuous changes
in the structure of credit, deposits and broad money, the demand for money
became unpredictable, making it difficult for the central bank to work with its
monetary regime.
Faced with missed targets and damaged credibility, the central bank decided
to choose between inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting. The later
was not considered appropriate because its two main objectives, lower inflation
and economic integration, were not relevant to the Armenian case (Central
Bank of Armenia). By 1998 Armenia was already experiencing low inflation
but achieving economic integration was complicated because it was not clear
whether Dram should be fixed to US dollar (since main financial inflows were
denominated in US dollar), or to Euro (since the trading was done with EU
countries). In both cases, the country would be vulnerable to shocks. There-
fore, the Central Bank of Armenia started in January 2006 a transition period
to fully-fledged inflation targeting, by making public only the central bank’s
actions. Like Albania, Armenia achieved macroeconomic steadiness prior to
the adoption of inflation targeting, making the regime attractive for its ability
to anchor expectations and not for the need to disinflate.
In early 90’s Armenia experienced considerably high level of inflation, but
reached single digit levels by 1998. In early 2000, average inflation was con-
siderably lower than the Commonwealth of Independent States, but a rapid
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increase in 2008 narrowed the gap.
Further, the economic growth in
Armenia was higher than the av-
erage CIS economic growth from
2001 to 2008. The effects of the
financial crisis are observed in
2009 when the growth decreased



































Armenia-GDP growth ! CIS-GDP growth !
after IT adoption!
Inflation and GDP growth performance
Czech Republic
With the economic stabilization package in 1991, Czech Republic introduced
the fixed exchange rate regime, which lowered inflation but not at the levels of
advanced economies. The Czech Koruna depreciated a little compared to the
other countries mainly due to the lower level of dollarization.2 After abandoning
the fixed exchange rate regime in 1997 due to currency problems, inflation rates
increased in Czech Republic.
In December 1997, Czech National Bank adopted inflation targeting, be-
coming the first transition country to adopt the new regime. This decision
was taken after a six month period of evaluating four options of monetary
policies: 1) introduce fixed exchange rate; 2) introduce money targeting;3 3)
adopt a ’just do it’ approach similar to FED; and 4) adopt inflation targeting
(Smidkova, 2008). The ’just do it approach’ and ’fixed exchange rate’ were not
applicable in this case, since the former would not allow central bank to an-
chor inflation expectations and convince the public that inflation would decline,
while the later would imply for the country to lose independence in conducting
the monetary policy (Jonas and Mishkin, 2004). On the other hand, money
targeting was not suitable due to the unstable capital inflows and the inability
to forecast the relation between monetary aggregates and inflation.
2See Jonas and Mishkin (2004).
3Both fixed exchange rate and monetary targeting had been used before by the Czech
National Bank.
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The average inflation rate in
Czech Republic before IT in
1996-1997 was 8.7%, while in the
past decade (2001-2011), it fell to
2.5%. In terms of GDP growth,
a continuous increase is observed
after adoption moving from 1.8%

































CR-GDP growth ! CEE-GDP growth !
Inflation and GDP growth performance
However, similar to Central and East European countries, Czech Republic was
affected by the crisis in 2009, but started a continous recover afterwards.
Georgia
After the ”Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia” was put in
place in 1995, the central bank had two main objectives of price and exchange
rate stability which were inconsistent with each other (Bakradze and Billmeier,
2007). The high degree of dollarization and under-developed financial markets,
made the focus of the central bank to keep stable exchange rates, leaving the
price stability objective aside. By 2004, the effort to keep stable exchange rate
caused a volatile liquidity situation and increased capital inflows (Bakradze
and Billmeier, 2007).
During 1999-2003, exchange rate fluctuations caused for a depreciation of
the domestic currency. Despite the several failed attempts taken by the Na-
tional Bank of Georgia to stabilize the situation, it was decided to start a
gradual process of moving toward inflation targeting which was publicly an-
nounced in 2009.
Prior to year 2004, average in-
flation in Georgia was relatively
lower than the average inflation
in Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, however after the
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Georgia-GDP growth ! CIS-GDP growth !
after IT adoption!
Inflation and GDP growth performance
Further, the GDP growth was higher than the region but heavily affected by
the crisis in 2009.
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Hungary
Unlike other countries like Czech Republic and Poland which adopted float-
ing exchange rates by late 1990’s, Hungary decided by May 2001, to widen
the band within which the currency fluctuates to 15% (up or down) from the
historical 2.25% used since the adoption of the exchange rate regime in 1995
(Jones and Mishkin, 2004). By 2000, it became obvious to the National Bank
of Hungary that the disinflation process had stopped. Therefore, to increase
the independence level of the bank in the conduct of monetary policy, it de-
cided to widen the band. The widening of the fluctuations band was seen as a
gradual transition step of the economy to inflation targeting. This transition
was characterized by a decline in the level of inflation and anchored inflation
expectations. By August 2001, the National Bank of Hungary announced the
end of the exchange rate regime and around the same time restrictions on cap-
ital flow were removed. After a decade of economic stability, Hungary moved
to inflation targeting in December 2001. Average inflation during 1993-2000
reached the value 18.1% and was characterized by continuous decline.
In the past decade this value fell
to 5.5% and except for year 2004
and 2007, remained below the
CEE average inflation. Also, the
economic growth of the country
was below the growth of the re-
gion, and the decline in 2009 due
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Inflation and GDP growth performance
Poland
Since 1990, the National Bank of Poland switched from fixed exchange rate to
crawling peg in a period of eight years. Initially, fixed exchange rates, com-
bined with price liberalization and no control on prices, pushed the prices up in
the early 1990s (Horska 2001). Reacting to a real appreciation of the domestic
currency, NBP moved to crawling peg with a band which was widened over
the years to allow for a gradual decrease in inflation rates from 44.4% (end of
the year) in 1992 to 9.8% (end of the year) in 1999, when inflation targeting
was adopted. Inflation targeting seemed attractive and suitable to the Polish
economy with developing financial markets and increasing openness, because
the existing monetary policy regime was facing the following three challenges:
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shocks from the anchor country, difficulty in communicating signals by National
Bank to the economy due to the abundant liquidity in banking and irregular
capital inflows (Horska 2001). In the past decade, Poland’s average inflation
was below the CEE average inflation, but the gap seems minimal in the last
two years.
An increase in average inflation
and decrease in economic growth
was observed in 2009. Although
the economic growth rate before
the crisis was below the region,
during the crisis, Poland experi-
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Inflation and GDP growth performance
Romania
In early 1990s Romanian economy was characterized by high inflation and a
monetary policy trading the necessary goal of price stability to focus more on
seigniorage, the important source of financing government expenditures (Da-
ianu 2008). Despite several objectives of the monetary policy followed by the
central bank to lower inflation, single digits level of inflation was achieved only
by 2004, moving from a level of 295% (end of year) in 1993 to 30% in 2001.
Money target was adopted as a monetary anchor since exchange rate framework
was not considered suitable due to unstable relationship between inflation and
interest rates (Daianu 2008). Since money targeting failed to achieve price sta-
bility, NBR decided to adopt inflation targeting in 2005 after some transitioning
time used to undertake some institutional reforms necessary for inflation target
like: bringing inflation down to single digit, achieving full operational indepen-
dence, improved financial system, successful disinflation and improvements in
demining the fiscal dominance.4
For the period 1996-2003, inflation averaged 50.7% which decreased drasti-
cally in the period 2004-2011 to 6.5%.
4Speech by the governor.
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For almost all the phase between
2001 and 2011, average inflation
in Romania was above the aver-
age level in CEE countries, but
the gap between them narrowed
down considerably by 2007 and
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Inflation and GDP growth performance
Apparently economic growth peaked in 2004, to fall drastically in 2009, and
gain momentum by 2011.
Turkey
In 2000, Turkey adopted a crawling exchange peg, which temporarily managed
to lower the level of inflation and interest rate, increasing people’s credibility
in the Central Bank. However, the positive outcomes did not last and the
exchange rate target led to the February 2001 crisis which was accompanied by
depreciation of the home currency, an annual inflation rate of 68% by 2001, a
considerably high level of dollarization, high fiscal dominance and increase in
public debt. Prior to the crisis, the increase need for public sector borrowing
was becoming a burden on the domestic financing, rather than on inflation tax,
which insured inflation levels not to increase (Ersel and Ozatay, 2008).
This situation later on caused for an boost in price and real interest rates,
pushing inflation rates up. Taking into consideration the inapplicability of
monetary targeting and the actual fiscal dominance in the economy, Central
Bank of Turkey announced in May 2001 that it would start a new stabilization
program, implying the implementation of implicit inflation targeting with very
few preconditions in place (Ersel and Ozatay, 2008).
For the period 1994-2002, infla-
tion rate averaged 68.7% but de-
creased drastically to 8.4% for
the time between 2004 and 2011.
Until 2007, average inflation in
Turkey remains at higher levels




























Turkey GDP growth ! CEE GDP growth !
Inflation and GDP growth performance
Economic growth increased from 2001, with slight changes, to start decline
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and reach bottom by 2009 following the same pattern as the group of CEE
countries.
Serbia
Serbia switched to inflation targeting in 2006, having the following goals in
mind: reach low and stable inflation, strengthen the domestic currency and
increase its credibility, improve the monetary policy reactions to both domestic
and foreign shocks, and make the proper economic changes in compliance with
the EU accession requirements (National Bank of Serbia).
On its agreement to inflation target, the National Bank of Serbia states
that inflation targeting was adopted to properly react to the effect that future
structural changes in the country will have in prices and also for the negative
impact that the high degree of dollarization would have in the transmission
mechanism of inflation. In that situation, the NBS argued that neither fixed
exchange rate, nor money target would ensure prices stability better than in-
flation targeting. Therefore, the goal of the bank was to build an environment
characterized by low and stable inflation, where it is more profitable to save in
the domestic currency, and the public is well aware of the exchange rate risk
that may affect their savings and investments in foreign currency.
For the period 1998-2001, infla-
tion averaged 55.4%, and man-
aged to reach single digits in-
flation rate by 2002, which was
short, lived. For the period
2002-20011, average inflation
was 9.4%, remaining during
2001-2011 period, well above
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Inflation and GDP growth performance
Similar to other countries, economic growth experienced a decline in 2009.
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4.2 Target performance
Missing targets
Experience has shown that inflation usually deviates from targets beyond the
margins set sometimes for prolonged periods and other times frequently. Ev-
idence confirms that economies with stable inflation miss the targets 30% of
the times, while countries in a process of disinflation miss the targets 60% of
the times (Roger, 2005). The largest deviations from the targets are associ-
ated with volatile exchange rate situations but usually detailed explanations
on the reasons for deviations are explained the Inflation Report or the Mone-
tary Policy Reports. Despite the deviations, no country has yet abandoned the
framework because of the deviations. The most common reaction by central
bank to missed targets is the adjustment of targets.
The causes for the target misses vary across country and time. Studying
the largest misses in a group of inflation targeting countries Roger and Stone
(2005) explain that the causes lay both in domestic and external shocks. Do-
mestic shocks are observed in the form of alterations in monetary and fiscal
policies, food supply, and some events specific to each country. External shocks
are observed as changes in capital inflows due to alteration of investors’ risk
sensitivity and changes in fuel prices.
Mishkin and Hebbel (2007) try to assess and compare the degree of the
achievement of the targeting central banks in hitting the targets with the suc-
cess of non-targeting central banks in keeping inflation around inflation trends.
At first look, it seemed that inflation targeters performed worse in terms of
larger deviations from the target compared to the non targeters. However,
when controlling for both country and time fixed effects and came to the con-
clusion that when comparing the whole group of countries, it was observed
that inflation deviations were smaller for targeting economies compared to non-
targeting.5
Figure 4.1 presents the actual annual inflation in relation to the target in-
flation in the nine inflation targeting countries in the sample.6 Different results
are observed across countries. Among the first countries to adopt the frame-
work Czech Republic and Poland, experienced inflation rates mainly within
the target but with continuous periods of undershooting the target. Hungary
5The authors point out that after changing the control group to include only non targeting
countries, the results are no longer statistically significant.
6Annual inflation is presented either in monthly or quarterly data, to better observe the
fluctuations.
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experienced frequent fluctuations in inflation around the target, which cen-
tral banks considers acceptable if they stay within the ±1 pp band. Turkey,
Armenia, and Serbia show frequent fluctuations of inflation target, mostly over-
shooting it. Romania set its initial target during a period of disinflation, and
continued to lower the target for a couple of years, during with the deviations
were not large. However, the impact of the crisis is observer in 2008 when
inflation rates rise again but as a result of actions of central bank, inflation
is brought back to the target level. Albania adopted inflation targeting after
achieving stable inflation and for the period of inflation targeting framework
2009-2011, the inflation level is observed within the band set by the central
bank. On the other hand, Georgia set the initial target at the start of a dis-
inflation period, which encouraged the central bank to declare a lower revised
target a year later. Following this action, inflation overshot in late 2010, but
fell back again in 2012.
In many cases inflation levels fall below the target, like the experience with
Poland in 2001 and Czech Republic during 1998-1999. The lower bound of the
inflation target has been treated differently by central banks. For some central
banks, the lower bound is similar to the upper one, and necessary measures are
taken once inflations falls below it, while some other central banks decided to
strengthen the unexpected disinflationary period (Jonas and Mishkin, 2004).
Poland is an example of the later case, as it decided to adjust its initial target of
1999 after the unexpected fall in inflation. Jonas and Mishkin (2004) mention
three reasons why this opportunistic reaction towards disinflation is bad: 1) it
will not be easily accepted by the politicians, as it may be accompanied by a
weaker economy and the need for a more relaxed monetary regime, which leads
to higher inflation; 2) the disinflation may occur due to temporary shocks, and
a response of the monetary policy is not recommended; 3) it could harm the
credibility of the inflation targeting regime, as the medium target announced by
the central bank aims to announce some predictions of the economic situation
and allow people to adjust their expectations and act accordingly.
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Source: National Statistics Offices
7Different periods are presented for different countries, in order to pay a closer look to the
inflation targeting period. For example, a longer period is graphed for the Czech Republic,
compared to Turkey
Chapter 5
Literature review on inflation
target impact
Many empirical studies have been conducted providing different results on the
impact of inflation targeting in the performance of the targeting economies.
The literature is mainly divided by its focus of countries under study, on in-
dustrial and emerging countries. It is common that some of these studies are
conducted on similar data and period sample, but using different methodolo-
gies to confirm or reject results from previous studies. The results are robust
to country sample, time sample and methodology used but different results
are obtained also because of the different impact of inflation targeting across
economies. Despite the fact that the countries studied in this thesis are con-
sidered emerging economies, for the purpose of a clear understanding of the
literature on inflation targeting, below are presented some results of studies on
both industrial and emerging countries
5.1 Empirical results from industrial economies
The first studies to be conducted on inflation targeting were focused on in-
dustrial countries. A series of them were performed on the quest to answer
the question ’Does inflation target matter?’. Neumann and Von Hagen (2001)
analyze nine industrial countries, six of which inflation targeters, for the period
1978-2001 to observe: 1) the effect of inflation targeting on inflation volatility,
output gaps and interest rates; and 2) policy reactions to both inflation and
large supply shocks. The results are positive and significant in terms of lower
inflation and restrained volatility of inflation and interest rates. Also, an im-
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portant observation is the increase in credibility of the countries’ central banks
which used to be high inflation economies. Similar positive results are observed
by Johnson (2002)1 in an analysis on five industrial countries. He concludes
that after the adoption of inflation targeting the expected level of inflation fell
considerably by 1 to 2 percentage points in most of the years. Nevertheless, he
points out that the level of inflation fell both in targeting and non targeting
countries.
Later on, Ball and Sheridan (2005) provide a critical approach to infla-
tion targeting. In their study of twenty OECD countries (seven targeters and
thirteen non-targeters), they find out that inflation targeting does not bring
positive outcomes on inflation, output and interest rates. They argue that if
one controls for the reversion to the mean, there is no evidence that inflation
targeting improves economic performance of an economy. The reversion to the
mean is explained by the fact that countries which experienced high inflation
prior to the 1990s, dis-inflated at a higher degree compared to countries with
low inflation rates. However, they explain that their study does not provide any
evidence that inflation targeting has been harmful to the countries adopting
it. In conclusion, authors suggest also that inflation targeting may cause two
benefits which they do not measure. First, inflation targeting may have more
positive social effects than economic ones.2 Second, inflation targeting may
improve economic performance in the future and similar studies may provide
evidence of better performance due to inflation target.
Using the same difference in difference method, Hyvonen (2004) argues
against the argument made by Ball and Sheridan (2005) that the inflation con-
vergence was just a property of cross country performance of inflation. His
empirical study is focused on the same twenty countries of Ball and Sheridan
(2005) for an extended period 1961-1992 to check the results of the previ-
ous study on a different time period. Observing the average inflation across
countries during periods that countries switched from one monetary policy
framework to another, convergence across countries which followed the same
monetary policy framework was observed. Hyvonen (2004) concludes that at
least partially, inflation targeting has influenced the convergence of inflation
rates during that period.
1Neumann and Von Hagen use Taylor rule and VAR analysis, while Johnson (2002) uses
panel data analysis.
2They explain that this view is consistent with Bernanke et al. idea that IT creates room
for open policymaking, allowing the central bank to act in accordance with principles of a
democratic society.
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Meanwhile, following panel estimations, Wu (2004) also observes that in
a group of twenty two OECD countries, inflation targeters experienced lower
average inflation rates and no evidence was found to support the idea that this
change is only due to the reversion to the mean. Moreover, despite the general
belief that the inflation targeting regime is conducted at the expense of a more
aggressive monetary policy in terms of real interest rates, Wu (2004) finds no
significant change in the real interest rates in the inflation targeting countries.
In addition, Lin and Ye (2007) study the impact of inflation targeting in
seven industrial countries by using a propensity score matching method. They
found out that the average treatment effects of inflation targeting on inflation
level and inflation volatility are small and insignificant. Similarly, the effects on
long term nominal interest rates and income velocity of money are insignificant.
However, using similar data as Lin and Ye (2007) on a dynamic panel analysis,
Brito (2011) finds out that inflation targeters has positive effects both in terms
of inflation level (a fall of 1.4 percentage points in inflation targeters) and GDP
growth.
5.2 Empirical results from emerging markets
Although empirical studies focusing only on emerging countries are fewer com-
pared to studies focusing on industrial or emerging and industrial countries,
they are important since they show more positive results of the impact of infla-
tion targeting. Gonçalves and Salles’ (2008) empirical study focuses on thirty
six emerging economies, out of which thirteen adopted inflation targeting. They
conclude that inflation targeters experience a larger decrease in average infla-
tion and lower output growth volatility compared to the non targeters, even
after accounting for the reversion to the mean. Meanwhile, the effects of infla-
tion target on inflation volatility have the expected negative sign but are not
significant. Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005) also conduct a similar study
of forty two emerging market countries, out of which thirteen being inflation
targeters. The results show that average inflation rate fell by 4.8 percentage
points more in targeting countries, while inflation volatility fell by 3.6 percent-
age points more. Moreover, they highlight the fact that the decline in average
inflation is not achieved at the expense of output growth.
Interesting results are presented by Lin and Ye (2009)3 who continued their
3Ball and Sheridan (2005), Hyvonen (2004), Gonçalves and Salles (2008) and Batini,
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2007 study on developed countries, with another study on fifty two developing
countries, out of which thirteen being inflation targeters. Contrary to their
results on developed countries, they found out that inflation targeting has a
considerable and significant effect in lowering inflation by almost 3 percentage
points in developing countries. The results for both studies were obtained by
using the same methodology on different country sample and period sample.
5.3 Empirical results from industrial and emerging
countries
Studies including both industrial and emerging economies provide a variety of
different results. Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2004) find out that while average
inflation has fallen in both developed and emerging economies, the latter have
recorded a worse performance. Likewise, volatility of output, interest rates and
exchange rates are higher in emerging economies. The reason for the weak per-
formance is explained by the idea that the emerging market inflation targeters
are faced with low credibility, weak institutions, instable macroeconomic envi-
ronment and external shocks. The authors recommend the emerging countries
to increase the level of communication and transperancy, treat the targets as a
communication mean, and develop a methodology for the convergence course
after a shock.
A different selection of country and period sample is used by Petursson
(2005) in his study of twenty one targeting countries (both emerging and in-
dustrial) and six non-targeting industrial countries. Inflation targeting is found
to have a statistically significant effect on the inflation targeters even after ac-
counting for global disinflation and domestic business cycles. However, the
results change when the country sample is reduced to include only the five
industrial inflation targeting countries. Petursson explains that the reason be-
hind these insignificant results for the industrial countries is that they already
achieved most of their disinflation prior to the adoption of inflation targeting.
Commenting on the decline in the inflation volatility in inflation targeters and
non targeters, the author emphasizes the idea that the fluctuations are still
higher than the rage usually set on the target (±1%), which may damage the
credibility of the central bank. The most common action of central banks under
Kuttner and Laxton (2005) use difference in difference methodology, while Lin and Ye use
propensity score matching to account for selection bias.
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this situation is to set long term targets and define actions to be taken in case
of large deviations.
Vega and Winkerlried (2005) have as main goal to study the development
of inflation dynamics (mean, variance, and persistence) caused by inflation
targeting through a propensity score match methodology. They found out that
inflation targeting caused a decrease in level and volatility of inflation in the
targeting countries. This decrease was at a higher degree for soft inflation
target compared to fully-fledged target. Moreover, it was pointed out that for
developing countries, the inflation targeting managed to reduce the persistence
of inflation because of the nominal anchor.4 Their results show that inflation
targeting achieves low inflation in both developed and developing countries but
the changes are higher in developing markets.
A study with a wider focus is conducted by Mishkin and Hebbel (2007) on
the impact of inflation targeting in twenty one inflation targeters, out of which
thirteen emerging countries and eight industrial. They set the control group to
be restrictive and include thirteen industrial countries. Based on three different
empirical works (difference in difference, panel var, and panel impulse response)
they found out that targeters performed better in terms of lowering the infla-
tion level and inflation volatility. They observe also that they improved both
in terms of efficiency of monetary policy and in macroeconomic performance
as a result of the increase in credibility. However, it is highlighted that the
non targeting industrial countries experienced higher levels of monetary policy
efficiency and better macro performance. They study also the performance of
the central banks in achieving the targets, and come to the conclusion that at
first glance it seems like inflation targeting countries are characterized by more
deviations from targets but once country and time specific effects are taken
into account, it is observed that inflation deviations are smaller for targeters.
Shifting away from the general focus of studies on the impact of inflation
in inflation and economic growth, Divino (2009)5 observes a group of emerging
and developing inflation targeting countries and arrives at the conclusion that
targeting economies managed to lower unemployment rate by five per cent in
the post period compared to the non targeting countries, after controlling for
the reversion to the mean. In terms of volatility of unemployment, no difference
is observed between the two groups. However, the estimated coefficient on the
4See also Levin et al (2004) who argue that in IT countries, inflation persistence decreases
while expectations are better anchored. See also Gurkaynak et al (2006).
5Divino (2009) uses a difference in difference method.
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economic growth, its volatility and the inflation targeting dummy are found
to be not significant. Additionally, Rose (2006) provides an analysis on the
international implications of inflation target in terms of exchange rate volatility,
’sudden stops’ of capital inflows, reserves and current accounts. In a sample of
sixty three countries (twenty three IT), the results show that inflation targeters
score lower exchange rate volatility and switching to an inflation targeting
regime is seen to be accompanied with a decline in the frequency of sudden
stops. However, in terms of reserve and current account, imbalances are similar
for both inflation targeters and non targeters.
5.4 Inflation targeting and financial crisis
Until the financial crisis of 2007, inflation targeting was considered the state of
art in the world of policymakers but the crisis was accompanied with a stream
of economists criticizing the framework. ”It is with regret that we announce the
death of inflation targeting”, writes Jeffrey Frankel (2012) stating that inflation
target death in 2008 was caused by the inflation targeting central banks which
did not pay the right attention to asset-price bubbles. He argues that these
central banks should have known than boom-bust cycles happen also in a low
inflation environment and they should have responded appropriately to asset
bubbles.
The financial crisis questioned the stability of the inflation targeting frame-
work and urged the central banks to make necessary changes in the framework
in order to ensure financial stability. Woodford (2011) suggests that inflation
targeting would be considered a failure only in the case that it has not ful-
filled its main characteristics but the period since 2008 has proved that it has
not failed. The financial crisis of 2007 has been compared with the recession
of 1930s but unlike it, it has not experienced deflationary twists. The study
strongly supports the idea that this maybe because of anchored inflation ex-
pectations in inflation targeting economies.
Positive results are shown in one of the latest studies on the performance
of fifty one industrial and emerging inflation targeting economies during the 28
months of financial crisis by Filho (2011). He concludes that due to the flexible
monetary policy, inflation targeters managed to lower both nominal and real
interest rates more than other countries, avoiding high deflationary threats.
Further, a sharp real depreciation was observed in targeting countries, which
not perceived risky by governments had the positive impact of switching the
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demand of the people to domestic goods. In terms of GDP growth, targeters
experienced smaller decrease in GDP growth compared to other countries, rank-
ing the inflation targeting countries among the best performing ones.
Fouejieu (2012)’s comparison of the targeting economies with non targeting
economies for the period 2008/2009, explains that inflation targeting central
banks experienced a lower increase in inflation fluctuations and real interest
rates. However, contrary to Filho’s results, no significant difference was ob-
served between the two groups regarding GDP growth. Arguing that the crisis
found targeters in better economic conditions regarding government debt, cur-
rent account balance, inflation rate and interest rate volatility, Fouejieu (2012)
raises the question of why the targeters did not perform better. He provides the
following explanations to this outcome: a) countries can be affected by crisis
despite the regime they follow; b) open economies were affected more by the
crisis, and since inflation targeters are considered economically and financially
open, they also were affected by crisis; and c) the focus of monetary policy on
inflation has neglected the importance of financial stability.
Chapter 6
Empirical analysis
A consolidated group of empirical works on inflation target developed in the
past two decades use a variety of different econometric methods to evaluate the
performance of the inflation targeters compared to non targeters. An assess-
ment of some of these studies in the literature review part shows that some of
these methods are: difference in difference approach; panel estimation; VAR
analysis; etc.
The difference in difference method is considered often as an experimen-
tal and econometric approach to measure the effect of a specific treatment on
two groups over two periods of time. It is based on the comparison of the
performance of inflation targeting countries with non inflation targeting coun-
tries in the periods before and after the adoption of the framework. Having
in mind that one of the main criticisms of this approach is the reversion to
the mean bias, Ball and Sheridan (2005) introduce a model which measures
the effect of inflation targeting but also controls for the change in performance
attributed mainly to the reversion to the mean. This method was later used in
many studies.1 The empirical part of this study will be focused on the widely
used ’difference and difference’ approach. The main focus of this method is to
observe if inflation targeting improved the performance of the targeting coun-
tries in terms of average inflation, inflation volatility, output growth, growth
volatility and dollarization.
1Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005), Gonçalves and Salles (2008), Geymael et al (2011),
Fouejieu (2011).
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6.1 Data sample
This section introduces the countries in the sample, period of study and the
macroeconomic variables to be examined. For this analysis are chosen twenty
nine countries, out of which eighteen are countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and eleven countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States.
There are nine inflation targeting countries in the sample and all of them have
at least three years of inflation targeting experience, with Albania and Georgia
being the last countries to have adopted inflation targeting in 2009.2 The
reasons behind the selection of this group of countries are related to the close
regional allocation and different degrees of dollarization.3
The main macroeconomic variables of interest are inflation, inflation volatil-
ity, output growth, output growth volatility and deposit dollarization. The
data for average inflation and output growth have been taken from the IMF
database World Economic Outlook (October 2012), while the data regarding
dollarization measures is collected from the national central banks.4
Since these countries are characterized by several periods of hyperinflation
prior to 1997, all the periods with inflation higher than 50% will be excluded
from the estimation.5 Therefore the baseline estimation will be conducted
without these hyperinflation periods, which is generally advised since coun-
tries experienced hyperinflation in the period before application and than a
drastic drop in inflation was observed. This aims to remove the chance that a
group of countries with periods of hyperinflation increase the degree of infla-
tion targeting impact on the performance of the economy. In this sample, both
inflation targeting countries and non inflation targeting countries experienced
high inflation until mid-90s.
The time period under study is from 1990 to 2011, but the baseline model
will include years between 1997 and 2011, including also the period of financial
crisis.6 The time frame will be divided into pre- and post- period for both
2The inflation targeters in the sample are: Albania, Armenia, Czech Republic, Georgia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. Moldova is not considered an inflation
targeter in the empirical part due to its short period of adoption.
3Being in the same region is believed to reduce selection bias.
4In the case of the Czech Republic, some inflation data and data on dollarization are
taken from the Czech National Bank.
5Ball (2010) recommends deleting the countries which have periods with hyperinflation.
Since the region from which the countries were selected experienced high inflation prior to
1997, it is not wise to follow Ball (2010) approach. Meanwhile, Gonçalves and Salles (2008)
decide to delete the periods with inflation higher than 50%.
6Further divisions regarding the period under study will be explained in the ’Methodology
section’.
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inflation targeting countries and non inflation targeting ones. For the inflation
targeting countries, the date dividing the periods will be considered the year
when the inflation target was announced.7 Meanwhile, for the non-targeters,
the year breaking the periods into pre- and post- adoption of inflation target,
will be considered average adoption date for the targeting countries in the
sample, which is year 2004.
6.2 Inflation and output statistics
Comparative detailed descriptive statistics on inflation performance and infla-
tion volatility is presented in Table A.1 (Appendix A) for nine inflation tar-
geting countries for the period prior and after adoption of inflation targeting.
For comparison with this group, it presents also the values of average inflation
and its volatility for twenty non inflation targeters. Inflation targeters reduced
their average inflation rate from 14.57 percent in the period before adoption to
5.8 percent after adoption.8 Meanwhile, for the non inflation targeters, average
inflation rate fell from 10.68 percent to 7.3 percent. Average inflation fell more
in the group of the inflation targeting economies after the adoption of inflation
target, compared to the average inflation in the group of non targeting coun-
tries. A similar pattern is observed for inflation volatility, which for inflation
targeters has dropped from 9.82 percent to 2.28 percent in the period after
adoption.9 For the non targeters, the volatility has changed from 7 percent to
4.31 percent. Since a decrease in both average inflation and inflation volatility
is observed in both targeting and non targeting countries, a conclusion cannot
be drawn yet on the impact of the inflation targeting.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for group performance
Mean Volatility Mean Volatility Mean Volatility Mean Volatility
Average (NIT) 10,68 7,00 7,30 4,31 6,24 3,67 4,86 5,25
Average (IT) 14,57 9,82 5,80 2,28 5,73 3,92 3,18 4,26




 Pre-period Post period
Source: : IMF World Economic Outlook
Similarly, Table A.2 (Appendix A) presents output growth and output
growth volatility for the twenty nine countries in the sample. Average out-
7Similar to the approach by Bernanke et al. (1999).
8Refering to baseline model 2 for period 1997-2011.
9Inflation volatility is measured as standard deviation of inflation.
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put growth for non targeters fell from 6.24 percent to 4.86 percent while for
targeters the drop was from 5.73 percent to 3.18 percent. Meanwhile GDP
growth volatility increased from 3.67 percent to 5.25 percent for non targeters
and 3.92 percent to 4.26 percent for targeters. Based on these general statistics,
the inflation targeting group experienced a larger decline in output growth but
a lower increase in output volatility compared to the non targeters. This gen-
eral statistics regarding output growth makes it more difficult to understand
the role of IT.
Moreover, Figure 6.1, depicts the main macroeconomic variables under
study in the inflation targeting countries for the period before and after adop-
tion of inflation target. Visual inspection of the Figure 6.1 confirms the above
observations on descriptive statistics. Both inflation level and inflation volatil-
ity in the inflation targeters have decreased in the post inflation target adoption
period, and a convergence of the countries as a group is observed towards lower
left side of the graph. On the other hand, the same observation cannot be made
regarding output growth. In most of the countries, the output growth volatility
fell, but a conclusive description regarding output growth is not observed.
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6.3 Methodology
As already explained, a difference-in-difference method is a cross country anal-
ysis used also to address the impact of inflation targeting. This method consists
in regressing the difference of an economic variable affected by inflation target
in the period before and after the IT adoption to a dummy variable for tar-
geters and was first proposed by Ball and Sheridan (2005). In order to remove
possible bias, Ball and Sheridan (2005) accounted for the reversion to the mean.
In this thesis the effect of inflation targeting will be estimated for the following
economic variables: inflation level, inflation volatility, output growth, output
growth volatility and deposit dollarization.
The Ball and Sheridan (2005) model used in this empirical analysis is:
Xpost - Xpre = a0 + a1D + a2Xpre + ε
Xpost Average value of variable X after the adoption of IT
Xpre Average value of variable X before the adoption of IT
D Policy dummy
(1 if the country is an inflation targeter and 0 if it is non- targeter)
a0 Constant
ε Error term
The most important element of the model is a1 which measures the effect
of inflation targeting on the economic variables X taken into consideration as a
measure of economic performance, given the initial conditions on X. Suppose
X measures average inflation. A significant and negative a1 shows that inflation
targeters experienced a larger decrease in average inflation compared to non-
targeters. Similarly, if X measures output growth, a significant and positive a1
shows that inflation targeters performed better.
The idea behind this methodology is simple and straightforward. The first
step is to calculate the average X for each country in the pre-period and post-
period. Then, calculate the average X for inflation targeters and non-inflation
targeters as groups.10 From a first glance, a cross-country difference in average
inflation and inflation volatility is observed. For example, in the pre-period
1997-2011, average inflation ranges from double digits (higher than 15%) in
10See Table A.1 for detailed results on average levels of inflation and inflation volatility.
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Belarus, to low single digits in Azerbaijan, Macedonia, and Latvia. In the
post period, almost all targeting countries11 and most of the non-IT countries
experienced a decrease in average inflation.
For robustness check, it is experimented with different country and period
samples in different regressions. The first model (Model 1) covers a period of
21 years between 1990 and 2011 and excludes all years with inflation higher
than 50%. Since, there are many new countries in the sample data is missing
for many of them until mid-90s. For this reason, the baseline model for this
empirical study will be Model 2 which is estimated with the same country
sample but over a shorter period of time 1997-2011.12 Moreover, Model 3
and Model 4 are estimated over the same period of time and same country
sample as Model 2. Model 3 is estimated without reversion to the mean to
observe the change in significance of a1, while Model 4 excludes countries which
continue to lack data in the shorter period 1997-2011, Kosovo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Montenegro. To increase the level of homogeneity, Fouejieu
(2012), recommends selecting the control group of non targeting countries based
on GDP per capita criteria. The control group should include countries with
GDP per capita not higher than the richest inflation targeting country, and not
lower than the poorest inflation targeter.13)
Table 6.2: Period and country samples
Model Period Description 
Model 1 1990-2011 All countries in the sample
Model 2 1997-2011 All countries in the sample*
Model 3 1997-2011 Same country sample as Model 2 but without revesion to the mean 
Model 4 1997-2011 Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina removed from the sample since they lack data for some years.
Model 5 1997-2011
Include in control group only countries with GDP per capita 
as high as the richest inflation targeter and as low as the 
poorest inflation targeter.
*Czech Republic is not included since it adopted IT in 1997 and a pre-period does not fall
into Model 2.
11For the Model 3, only four non-IT countries experienced an increase in average inflation.
12Czech Republic cannot be included in this regression since it adopted inflation targeting
in 1997 and a pre-period cannot be calculated.
13The richest inflation targeter is Czech Republic, and Slovenia is droped since it has a
higher level GDP per capita. On the lower limit, Georgia is the poorest target in terms of
GDP, therefore, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kyrgys Republic and Tajikistan, with lower level of
GDP per capita. (See Table A.4
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6.4 Empirical Results
Inflation
In four sample models regressed for robustness check, the inflation target
dummy is statistically significant and has a negative sign (see Table 6.3). The
regression results for the first model, covering the period 1990-2011, show that
average inflation in non-IT countries would have fallen by 2.796 percentage
points more if they had adopted inflation targeting. Similar results are ob-
tained for Model 2, with the period 1997-2011, when the coefficient for the IT
dummy is -2.53, showing that average inflation fell more by 2.53 percentage
points in inflation targeting countries. This effect is statistically significant at
90% confidence level.
Model 3 is estimated without taking into consideration the reversion to the
mean, in order to understand the significance of this term in the model. The
coefficient a1 is still significant and negative but considerably higher (5.1p.p)
compared to Model 2. This coefficient is almost same as the difference in
difference between the means of targeters and non targeters in the period pre
and post. Higher coefficient in Model 3 means that without introducing the
reversion to the mean term in the model, a1 coefficient on IT dummy captures
also the effects caused by the reversion to the mean. These results confirm the
Ball and Sheridan (2005) emphasis on the importance of the reversion to the
mean, because otherwise the results obtained are biased.
Moreover, as it was already mentioned, this region of countries is quite
problematic in terms of data. Although Model 2 includes data from 1997,
some countries, like Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue
to lack data for a couple of years. Therefore, for robustness check, Model 4
is regressed without taking these countries into consideration for period 1997-
2011. The coefficient for inflation target dummy is still negative and significant.
Compared to Model 2 results, this coefficient is slightly higher (2.793 p.p)
and more significant. However, once accounting for a control group similar to
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Table 6.3: Regression results for inflation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IT dummy -2,796 -2,351 -5,105 -2,793 -2,209
(1.199)** (1.073)* (2.869)* (1.175)** 1,337
Initial condition -0,737 -0,708 -0,719 -0,727
(0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)*** (0.072)***
Constant 3,984 4,177 -3,384 4,775 4,31
(1.004)*** (0.899)*** (1.533)** (0.962)*** (0.975)***
No. of obs 29 28 28 25 23
Adj-R-squared 0,86 0,85 0,07 0,86 0,85
INFLATION
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
targeting group in terms of GDP per capita in Model 5, the inflation targeting
coefficient becomes insignificant.
Similar to the results on inflation, the regression results show that inflation
volatility fell ceteris paribus, more in the IT countries than for non-IT countries
by 2.14 percentage points in Model 1 and 2.58 percentage points in Model 2.
In the robustness check model 4, inflation volatility is observed to fall by 2.75
percentage points. In model 2, adjusted R-squared for regression on inflation
is 85% while for inflation volatility 78%, showing a good explanation of data
by the model. An increase in adjusted R-squared is observed in Model 4 where
the countries included have available data for all years under study. Model
3, which is regressed to understand the importance of the reversion to the
mean shows a very low adjusted R-square in both cases. However, although
Model 5 presented insignificant results in terms of inflation, it presents negative
and statistically significant inflation targeting coefficient, in terms of inflation
volatility.
As observed in the regressions for inflation and inflation volatility, the co-
efficient for the initial condition is negative and highly significant in all cases,
showing a considerable impact of the reversion to the mean. Therefore, infla-
tion would have dropped in the inflation targeting countries even if no inflation
target was adopted but the adoption of inflation targeting helped decline more.
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Table 6.4: Regression results for inflation volatility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IT dummy -2,141 -2,578 -5,091 -2,748 -2,685
(1.144)* (1.313)* (2.598)* (1.410)* (1.499)*
Initial condition -0,898 -0,890 -0,890 -0,909
(0.105)*** (0.100)*** (0.108)*** (0.118)***
Constant 3,361 3,540 -2,690 3,709 3,837
(1.166)*** (0.959)*** (1.323)* (1.077)*** (1.08)***
No. of obs 29 27 27 24 22
Adj-R-squared 0,74 0,78 0,10 0,78 0,78
INFLATION VOLATILITY
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
Figure 6.2 shows the inflation convergence14 in the inflation targeting coun-
tries. The graph on the left plots the difference between average inflation in
the post period and average inflation in the pre period in the y-axis against
the pre period average inflation in the x-axis. Similarly, the graph on the right
shows the negative relation between the difference in post inflation volatility
with pre inflation volatility in the y axis and pre inflation volatility in the x
axis. The negative relation is clear from both figures.

























































Source: Data from IMF World Economic Outlook
14Ball and Sheridan (2005) consider the observed inflation convergence as a characteristic
of a cross country performance regarding inflation. Hyvonen (2004) attributes the inflation
convergence to the monetary policy in place and considers it an objective of the policy.
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Output growth
The same method used for inflation is used to analyze output growth and its
volatility, using data on output growth at constant prices from the IMF World
Economic Outlook. The descriptive statistics show that the average output
growth fell for both targeting countries and non targeting countries from the
period before adoption to the period after adoption. Meanwhile, the regression
results presented in Table 6.5 do not confirm that inflation target adoption had
a positive effect in the output growth. However, based on the economic theory,
positive results are not expected, but it is important that no negative effect is
observed, showing that the disinflation is not achieved at the expense of output
growth. The negative sign is observed in all the regressions, which means that
inflation targeting countries experience a more pronounced slowdown of output
growth but none of the results is significant.
Table 6.5: Regression results for GDP growth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IT dummy -1,282 -1,487 -1,504 -1,836 -1,202
1,060 1,091 1,124 1,152 1,182
Initial condition (-0.515)** -0,405 -0,289 -0,341
0,235 0,252 0,279 0,289
Constant 2,153 1,315 -0,985 1,001 0,671
1,369 1,546 0,601 1,640 1,855
No. of obs 29 28 28 25 23
Adj-R-squared 0,12 0,08 0,03 0,07 0,01
OUTPUT GROWTH
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
Regarding the output growth volatility, the regression results show that the
IT coefficient is negative but never statistically significant. These results are
similar to Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005) while Gonçalves and Salles (2008)
observe a larger fall in growth volatility for inflation targeting countries.
Meanwhile, the reversion to the mean continues to be important and signif-
icant for both output growth and output growth volatility, but to a lesser value
compared to the average inflation and inflation volatility. This conclusion is
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Table 6.6: Regression results for GDP growth volatility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IT dummy -0,478 -0,243 -0,739 -0,612 -0,967
1,291 1,366 1,908 1,487 1,399
Initial condition -1,283 -1,227 -1,033 -1,371
(0.225)*** (0.245)*** (0.383)** (0.256)***
Constant 6,228 5,933 1,616 5,539 7,223
(1.105)*** (1.107)*** 0,971 (1.439)*** (1.254)***
No. of obs 28 27 27 24 22
Adj-R-squared 0,54 0,47 -0,03 0,21 0,57
OUTPUT GROWTH VOLATILITY
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
confirmed by the Figure 6.3, showing that the negative relationship is still in
place but not as obvious as in the case of inflation.





















































Source: Data from IMF World Economic Outlook
Dollarization
From the short descriptions on the rationale for adoption of inflation targeting
of the nine countries in the sample, it was observed that for some of them,
the issue of dollarization was considered an important condition to be taken
into account when deciding the type of monetary policy. Also, the literature
review showed that it has been argued that highly dollarized economies face
constraints in conducting independent monetary policy. To test whether the
6. Empirical analysis 62
benefits of inflation targeting in terms of inflation and inflation volatility, ob-
served in the previous sections, have been affected by the degree of dollarization,
a cross-term of inflation target and deposit dollarization is included in the Ball
and Sheridan (2005) model:
Xpost - Xpre = a0 + a1D + a2Xpre + a3dd + a4dd ∗D + ε,
where the X variable is average inflation, D is the inflation target dummy,
dd is deposit dollarization and dd ∗D is the cross-term on deposit dollarization
and inflation target. To avoid endogeneity, the deposit dollarization level in the
last year before the adoption of inflation targeting is used for all the inflation
targeters. The time period is from 1997 to 2011 as defined in Model 2 for 27
countries in the sample.15
Table 6.7: Regression results on dollarization
Inflation Inflation volatility
1997-2011 1997-2011
IT dummy (-6.081) (-3.791)
(3.047)* 3,622








No. of obs 27 26
Adj-R-squared 0,85 0,78
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
The empirical results on inflation show a negative and significant coefficient
of inflation target dummy while the coefficient of the cross-term on inflation
15Information on deposits could not be found on the website of the Central Bank of Uzbek-
istan and Russia does not report the deposits divided in national currency and foreign cur-
rency.
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target and dollarization is statistically non-significant. Therefore, it can be
assessed that the degree of deposit dollarization does not have an impact on
the benefits of inflation targeting in terms of inflation. These results confirm
the trend presented in Figure 3.2 of continuous declines in inflation levels also
in highly dollarized inflation targeting economies.
However, the results on inflation volatility are inconclusive, since both the
coefficient of inflation target dummy and the coefficient of the cross-term are
not significant.16
16Another empirical model is regressed to observe if IT adoption contributes in lowering
the degree of dollarization. For this reason, the difference in difference model by Ball and
Sheridan (2005) is used to regress the difference in post period average deposit dollarization
level and pre period average deposit dollarization level to the inflation target dummy and
the pre period average deposit dollarization level. Therefore, dollarization is placed as a
right-hand side variable in the model.
The results obtained show insignificant coefficients for IT dummy and the average dollar-
ization in the pre period. Moreover, the R-squared value is low, showing not a good fit of
the model. It can be concluded that these results are inconclusive for the period and country
sample under study. However, if the same study were to be conducted in the future, to allow
for a longer experience with inflation targeting, maybe results may change. Detailed results
are presented in Appendix A (Table A.5).
Conclusion
In economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States inflation targeting has been adopted for many years but can still
be considered a new policy regime. The first countries to adopt inflation tar-
geting were Czech Republic and Poland, marking also the start of inflation
target adoption by emerging countries in the World. Later on, other countries
followed the way, with the latest being Moldova. The short period of time since
adoption, combined with the small number of countries in the group make any
study on the matter slightly preliminary which would need to be developed
further in the years to come. However, this thesis aims to bring two novel
elements to the literature on inflation targeting. First, to the current author’s
knowledge, no other study has been conducted focusing in this group of coun-
tries within the two close regions. Second, it seeks to provide a new analysis
on the impact of dollarization on the benefits of inflation targeting.
The general description of inflation targeting framework with a specific fo-
cus on the nine inflation targeting countries in the sample, shows that despite
the differences in economic performance or political situation between the coun-
tries, the general institutional framework of inflation targeting is similar in all
the economies. However some of the inflation targeting countries in these two
regions decided to slowly transition to inflation targeting after attempting to
put in place some essential infrastructure for the new regime. Not all necessary
preconditions were in place even after adoption, but they achieved improved
conditions gradually by close collaboration between central banks. In terms
of deposit dollarization, most of the countries have moderate or high degree
of dollarization. This did not seem to be an obstacle in the process of lower-
ing inflation but it is generally suggested that policymakers put considerable
emphasis on dollarization when designing the proper monetary policy.
The empirical evidence found in the country and period sample under study
is positive both in terms of inflation level and inflation volatility, which fell more
in countries adopting inflation targeting compared to non-targeters.
However, as already supported by literature evidence, no negative effect by
inflation targeting is observed on output growth or output growth volatility.
On the other hand, it was found that the degree of dollarization does not have
any impact, either positive or negative, in the benefits of inflation target in
terms of inflation. No conclusive results can be drawn regarding the effect
of inflation targeting framework in lowering the degree of dollarization. A
simple reason for this can be the relatively short period of adoption of inflation
targeting for the economies with high level of dollarization.
To conclude, inflation targeting remains an attractive regime for the region and
other countries are expected to join the inflation targeters group, leaving room
for further studies in the future. Despite the attempt of critics to diminish the
reputation of this framework as ’the state of art’ after the financial crisis, it is
not losing its importance and attention from scholars, economists, and policy
makers.
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Appendix A
Tables
Table A.1: Detailed descriptive statistics in inflation and inflation
volatility
inflation





1 Belarus 29,69 12,29 29,69 12,29 16,36 16,50
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2,26 2,18 2,26 2,18 3,44 2,69
3 Bulgaria 7,60 5,60 7,60 5,60 5,98 3,36
4 Croatia 3,54 1,61 3,75 1,72 3,02 1,55
5 Estonia 12,74 14,61 5,05 3,21 4,77 3,23
6 Kazakhstan 12,57 10,65 9,25 4,04 9,54 3,58
7 Kosovo 3,62 5,70 3,62 5,70 3,05 4,39
8 Kyrgyz Republic 18,01 15,07 13,08 11,99 10,83 7,26
9 Latvia 9,93 11,36 3,84 2,20 6,44 5,24
10 Lithuania 0,61 1,04 0,61 1,04 4,69 3,18
11 FYR Macedonia 3,61 4,83 2,25 2,54 2,70 2,96
12 Moldova 18,26 11,81 16,11 12,23 9,24 4,69
13 Montenegro 13,51 9,79 13,51 9,79 3,62 2,59
14 Russia 28,72 24,08 26,34 24,58 10,35 2,56
15 Slovak Republic 8,27 2,97 7,74 2,68 2,65 1,51
16 Slovenia 11,04 7,92 7,04 1,79 2,67 1,56
17 Ukraine 13,04 9,00 13,04 9,00 13,41 5,92
18 Azerbaijan 3,25 7,47 1,18 4,46 10,08 6,56
19 Uzbekistan 26,22 14,09 22,26 9,21 12,22 1,87
20 Tajikistan 25,41 13,76 25,41 13,76 10,89 5,02
Average (NIT) 12,60 9,29 10,68 7,00 7,30 4,31
1 Albania 8,13 9,82 6,57 9,96 3,08 0,75
2 Armenia 5,78 6,41 4,34 4,82 5,83 2,48
3 Czech Republic 12,17 5,78 3,51 2,94
4 Georgia 10,03 9,69 7,59 4,24 5,79 3,59
5 Hungary 21,05 7,80 13,08 4,03 5,48 1,83
6 Poland 28,86 10,28 14,90 4,36 3,30
7 Romania 30,84 13,04 29,28 14,90 6,53 1,44
8 Serbia 19,00 13,34 19,00 13,34 9,24 2,54
9 Turkey 21,81 17,48 21,81 17,48 8,35 1,68
Average (IT) 17,52 10,41 14,57 9,82 5,80 2,28
 Pre-period (Model 1)  Pre-period (Model 2) Post period
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
A. Tables II
Table A.2: Detailed descriptive statistics in output growth and output
growth volatility
gdp
Country Mean St. Deviation Mean 
St. 
Deviation Mean St. Deviation 
1 Belarus 7,07 3,28 7,07 3,28 7,37 3,59
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5,45 2,90 5,45 2,90 2,94 3,39
3 Bulgaria 6,15 1,40 6,15 1,40 3,16 4,58
4 Croatia 4,17 2,12 3,65 2,05 1,14 4,35
5 Estonia 5,81 4,14 7,21 3,51 2,63 8,83
6 Kazakhstan 6,11 5,38 6,80 5,30 6,92 3,49
7 Kosovo 8,58 12,51 8,58 12,51 4,60 1,50
8 Kyrgyz Republic 4,17 4,48 5,05 3,11 3,88 3,55
9 Latvia 5,21 3,26 6,69 1,85 2,14 10,34
10 Lithuania 5,96 3,25 6,06 3,46 2,97 8,38
11 FYR Macedonia 1,75 2,89 2,17 3,06 3,65 2,31
12 Moldova 1,45 5,51 2,72 5,33 4,37 4,87
13 Montenegro 7,99 1,41 7,99 1,41 4,24 5,37
14 Russia 3,34 5,44 4,33 5,04 4,16 5,54
15 Slovak Republic 4,47 3,23 3,51 3,11 4,84 4,94
16 Slovenia 4,00 0,89 4,02 0,88 2,03 4,91
17 Ukraine 4,97 6,13 4,97 6,13 2,09 7,75
18 Azerbaijan 7,82 2,79 8,48 2,10 15,86 12,77
19 Uzbekistan 15,68 4,38 15,68 4,38 11,39 3,10
20 Tajikistan 6,08 5,04 8,20 2,68 6,74 1,36
Average (NIT) 5,81 4,02 6,24 3,67 4,86 5,25
1 Albania 3,39 10,19 5,68 5,51 3,27 0,25
2 Armenia 8,68 4,52 9,07 4,62 4,40 10,21
3 Czech Republic 4,54 2,72 3,05
4 Georgia 6,89 3,79 6,59 3,79 3,14 6,00
5 Hungary 0,11 4,82 3,65 0,58 2,00 3,33
6 Poland 5,27 1,89 7,09 4,08 1,69
7 Romania 4,67 2,92 4,38 3,24 2,85 5,30
8 Serbia 2,07 7,81 2,07 7,81 1,99 3,12
9 Turkey 7,30 1,91 7,30 1,91 4,18 5,38
Average (IT) 4,77 4,73 5,73 3,92 3,18 4,26
 Pre-period (Model 1)  Pre-period (Model 2) Post period
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook

















world GDP World bank classification
Albania 3,23 4019,99 24,95 33,80 56,00 0,02% Lower middle income
Armenia 3,33 3076,41 30,76 23,48 48,09 0,01% Lower middle income
Czech Republic 10,53 20435,88 24,54 72,55 68,53 0,31% High income OECD
Georgia 4,47 3210,30 26,23 36,45 55,12 0,02% Lower middle income
Hungary 9,99 14050,01 19,07 92,27 84,91 0,20% High income OECD
Moldova 3,56 1968,95 24,49 45,02 86,22 0,01% Lower middle income
Poland 38,20 13468,66 21,72 0,73% High income OECD
Romania 21,38 8874,62 28,81 38,34 43,49 0,27% Upper middle income
Serbia 7,57 5725,16 18,93 36,08 51,22 0,07% Upper middle income
Turkey 74,72 10362,61 23,82 23,74 32,63 1,11% Upper middle income
Mean IT 17,70 8519,26 24,33 44,64 58,47 0,28%
Median IT 8,78 7299,89 24,51 36,45 55,12 0,13%
Mean non-IT all 16,56 9378,58 23,05 54,83 60,65 0,21%
Median non -it all 5,49 7312,09 22,41 54,54 65,33 0,06%
Source: World Economic Outlook IMF
A. Tables III
Table A.4: GDP per capita in targeters and non-targeters
No. Country -IT GDP per capita No. Country -NIT GDP per capita
1 Czech Republic 20.677                     1 Slovenia 24.132               
2 Hungary 14.043                     2 Slovak Republic 17.782               
3 Poland 13.352                     3 Estonia 16.534               
4 Turkey 10.524                     4 Croatia 14.193               
5 Romania 8.874                       5 Lithuania 14.100               
6 Serbia 6.312                       6 Latvia 13.727               
7 Albania 4.030                       7 Russian Federation 12.995               
8 Armenia 3.305                       8 Kazakhstan 11.357               
9 Georgia 3.203                       9 Bulgaria 7.283                 
10 Montenegro 7.111                 
11 Azerbaijan 6.912                 
12 Belarus 5.820                 
13 Macedonia, FYR 5.058                 
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.821                 
15 Ukraine 3.615                 
16 Kosovo 3.579                 
17 Moldova 1.967                 
18 Uzbekistan 1.546                 
19 Kyrgyz Republic 1.124                 
20 Tajikistan 935                    
Source: World Bank Database















The empirical model presented in the methodology part is a derivation
of several detailed steps and analysis conducted by Ball and Sheridan
(2005). The authors start from the following equation:
Xit = k + a1Qit + µi + ηt + υit,
where Xit is the value of macroeconomic variable X in country i and
time t, Qit is the inflation targeting dummy equal to 1 if the country
is a targeter and 0 otherwise, µi and ηt are the country specific effect
and time specific effects, respectively, while υit is the error term. First
differencing the equation over time gives the following equation for cross
country analysis:
Xi,post −Xi,pre = (ηpost − ηpre) + a1Di + (υi,post − υi,pre),
where macroeconomic variable X depends on a constant (ηpost − ηpre),
an error term (υi,post − υi,pre) and a dummy D. At this point, Ball and
Sheridan observe that the inflation target dummy is biased and may
attribute positive results to inflation targeting in reducing inflation, even
if there is no such effect.1 To fix this issue, they add the initial condition
of the macroeconomic variable also on the right hand side and get the
following equation:
1The doubt for possible bias relies on the fact that economies with higher initial inflation
have greater chances to adopt inflation target. Therefore, higherXi,pre, would imply also
higherυi,pre, explaining a positive relation of the errorυi,pre, with the dummy. However, in
the equation, −υi,pre has a negative sign showing a negative correlation.
B. Difference in Difference Methodology V
Xi,post −Xi,pre = (ηpost − ηpre) + a1Di + a2Xi,pre + (υi,post − υi,pre),
which can be interpreted as an OLS estimator
Xpost −Xpre = a0 + a1D + a2Xpre + ε
The authors argue that since economies experiencing high levels of in-
flation were more attracted by inflation targeting regime, a bigger im-
provement compared to non targeters may be attributed to temporary
factors and their initial performance. For this reason, the last equation
accounts for the reversion to the meanXpre.
